Board monitoring and firm performance: evidence from the UK by Hanafy, Asmaa
American University in Cairo 
AUC Knowledge Fountain 
Theses and Dissertations 
2-1-2020 
Board monitoring and firm performance: evidence from the UK 
Asmaa Hanafy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds 
Recommended Citation 
APA Citation 
Hanafy, A. (2020).Board monitoring and firm performance: evidence from the UK [Master’s thesis, the 
American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/843 
MLA Citation 
Hanafy, Asmaa. Board monitoring and firm performance: evidence from the UK. 2020. American 
University in Cairo, Master's thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/843 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more 
information, please contact mark.muehlhaeusler@aucegypt.edu. 
 
 
 
 
The American University in Cairo 
School of Business 
 
Board Monitoring and Firm Performance: Evidence from the UK  
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to 
The Department of Management 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Master of Science in Finance 
by 
Asmaa Aly Hanafy 
Under the supervision of Dr. Nermeen Shehata 
 
December 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Table of Contents 
1.Introduction ............................................................................................................ 4 
2.Literature review .................................................................................................... 5 
2.1 Board functions and its effectiveness................................................................ 5 
2.2 Board of directors and firm performance .......................................................... 6 
2.2.1 Number of board meetings and firm performance ...................................... 8 
2.2.2 Number of board committees and firm performance ................................ 10 
2.2.3 Number of independent board members and firm performance ................ 11 
2.2.4 Board size and firm performance ............................................................. 15 
2.3 Theories ......................................................................................................... 16 
2.4 Summary of the literature review ................................................................... 18 
3. Research methodology ........................................................................................ 18 
3.1 Sample size and data ...................................................................................... 18 
3.2 Model ............................................................................................................ 19 
4. Results ................................................................................................................ 21 
4.1 Descriptive statistics ...................................................................................... 21 
4.2 Correlation ..................................................................................................... 21 
4.2.1 Pearson correlation .................................................................................. 21 
4.2.2 Chi-Square test ........................................................................................ 23 
4.3 Results of model 1 ......................................................................................... 23 
4.4 Results of model 2 ......................................................................................... 27 
5.Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 31 
References ............................................................................................................... 33 
List of appendices ................................................................................................... 37 
Appendix 1: Summary of the literature review ..................................................... 37 
Appendix 2: ROA output without time effect ....................................................... 45 
Appendix 3: ROA output with time effect ............................................................ 50 
Appendix 4: ROA OLS output ............................................................................. 55 
Appendix 5: ROA fixed model ............................................................................ 56 
Appendix 6: ROA f-test ....................................................................................... 57 
Appendix 7: Tobin’s Q output without time effect ............................................... 58 
Appendix 8: Tobin’s Q output with time effect .................................................... 63 
Appendix 9: Tobin’s Q OLS output ..................................................................... 68 
Appendix 10: Tobin’s Q fixed model ................................................................... 69 
Appendix 11: Tobin’s Q f-test .............................................................................. 70 
3 
 
 
Abstract 
There are several research papers regarding the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. One of the aspects of corporate governance is the 
board of directors. Board monitoring is a critical aspect which can be measured by 
number of board meetings and number of board committees. There are several studies 
on board diversity and composition of board of directors and firm performance, while 
there are few research studies on the number of board committees and board meetings 
and their relationship with the firm performance. Accordingly, this thesis focuses on 
the relationship between board monitoring measured by number of board meetings and 
number of board committees and firm performance in the UK. The sample is Financial 
Times and London Stock Exchange (FTSE) 150 which includes the largest 150 listed 
companies on London Stock Exchange. Firm performance is measured by an 
accounting measure which is return on assets (ROA) and a market performance 
measure which is Tobin’s Q. The results of this study show that there is no significant 
relationship between number of board meetings and firm performance. However, there 
is a significant negative relationship between number of board committees and firm 
performance. 
 
Keywords: board committees, board meetings, corporate governance, firm 
performance, FTSE150, UK. 
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1.Introduction 
Corporate governance is an essential component that controls companies’ 
operations. It sets specific guidelines for management to make sure that stakeholders’ 
rights are maintained. There are several definitions of corporate governance. One of 
these definitions stated by Zingales (1998: 4) is that corporate governance means the 
“allocation of ownership, capital structure, managerial incentive schemes, takeovers, 
board of directors, pressure from institutional investors, product market competition, 
labour market competition, organizational structure, etc., can all be thought of as 
institutions that affect the process through which quasi-rents are distributed”. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997: 4) stated that corporate governance is “the ways in which suppliers 
of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”. 
Srivastava, Das and Pattanayak (2018: 2) defined corporate governance as “a set of 
predefined rules which guide the actions of managers resulting in the best interest of 
investors”. This thesis focuses on the definition illustrated by Srivastava, Das and 
Pattanayak (2018) since it is the most relevant one to this study.  
The theory which is pertinent to this thesis is the agency theory. Bendickson, 
Muldoon, Liguori and Davis (2016) argued that agency theory is applied to various 
disciplines. Agency theory deals with the relationship between principal and agent. The 
principal has certain goals to be achieved and the agent has responsibilities that should 
be performed. If the actions of the agent are not aligned with the interests of the 
principals, this will lead to conflict of interest between them. According to the agency 
theory, the agents are the management of the company while the principals are the 
shareholders of the company. The goal of the shareholders is to maximize their wealth 
to increase firm performance. The agents work on behalf of the firm which has the 
money of the shareholders. Sometimes, there is conflict of interest that occurs between 
the shareholders and management of the company. Accordingly, governance is needed 
to resolve this agency problem. The board of directors is one of the solutions for this 
issue as they oversee the actions of the management to help them work in the best 
interest of the shareholders. 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), six principles of corporate governance are addressed. The first principle deals 
with the transparency and the fairness of the market. The second principle illustrates 
the rights of the shareholders and the fairness in their treatment. Stock markets, 
institutional investors and other intermediaries are the focus of the third principle. The 
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fourth principle interprets stakeholders’ roles. The fifth principle is about transparency 
and disclosure, while the sixth principle is the roles and responsibilities of the board of 
directors (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2015) 
This thesis focuses on the last principle of corporate governance which is the 
roles and responsibilities of the board of directors and their relationship with firm 
performance. It examines the effect of board monitoring on the firm performance in 
UK. This thesis will contribute to the literature since there are few research studies 
about the number of board committees, which is one of the independent variables, and 
their effect on firm performance. This thesis is divided into five sections: introduction, 
the literature review, the research methodology, the results, and the conclusion. 
2.Literature review 
2.1 Board functions and its effectiveness 
An essential aspect for board of directors is their effectiveness. Masli, Sherwood 
and Srivastava (2018) argue that certain aspects should be taken into consideration to 
ensure the effectiveness of the board. The first aspect deals with the independence of 
board members. They found that the higher the number of independent board members, 
the better the effectiveness of the board. That is due to their ability to strive for 
achieving the goal of the shareholders which is maximizing their wealth. There are also 
laws that enhance this independence aspect. For example, the Sarbanes Oxley act 
(SOX) in the section 301, requires that all members in audit committee should be 
independent. It was also required by New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (Nasdaq) (Masli, Sherwood 
and Srivastava, 2018). NYSE is a large stock exchange based in New York (NYSE, 
2018). Nasdaq is also located in New York and is the largest electronic stock exchange 
in the world (The Nasdaq story, 2018). There should be more independent board 
members especially in the compensation and nomination committees. Nomination and 
compensation committees should have all their members independent. Accordingly, 
after the issuance of SOX, firms are more likely to have more independent members 
than before. They also prefer not to have the chief executive officer (CEO) and the 
chairman of the company to be the same person. The activity of board members is the 
second aspect which is measured by the frequency of board meetings and the attitude 
of the board members themselves such as how they prepare for the meetings, their 
attendance, participation and follow up. Regulators believe that the board effectiveness 
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increases as the board activity increases. The third characteristic is about the 
competence of the board members, it illustrates that as the competency of board 
members such as their expertise and their knowledge about the firm processes and its 
industry increase, their ability to monitor and guide the management will improve. The 
behavioral attributes of board members are the last feature, it deals with their 
capabilities to work as one team, reach effective solutions and encourage good 
relationships among the board members (Masli, Sherwood and Srivastava, 2018). This 
thesis focuses on the second aspect of board effectiveness which is the activity of the 
board members. It will be measured by number of board meetings and number of board 
committees. 
 
2.2 Board of directors and firm performance 
Various aspects about board of directors were examined by previous research 
such as: board size, board composition and board monitoring. Bachiller, Giorgino and 
Paternostro (2014) argue that several studies illustrate the relationship between the 
structure of the board of directors and firm performance. These studies usually focus 
on two aspects which are the board size and the composition. Regarding the size, they 
concluded that board size and company performance are negatively correlated. This 
negative relationship is due to the concept of ‘free-riders’. Because of the increase in 
board size, not all members will participate in the decision-making process. 
Accordingly, some of them will take the role of free-riders and this will negatively 
impact firm performance. Other studies argue that there is no relationship between 
board size and firm performance (Beiner, Dorbetz, Schmid and Zimmermann, 2004), 
while some studies suggested that board size depends on the type of organization. These 
studies support that there is a positive relationship between the board size and firm 
performance (represented by Tobin’s Q) in complex entities. These entities are high 
debt and diversified entities (entities have various businesses or products that are not 
related). Diversified companies need higher level of board monitoring than other types 
of companies since they have different business segments that require diverse 
backgrounds. This can be achieved by having a large board size including several 
outsiders that have distinct backgrounds. On the other hand, since high debt firms need 
more advice to secure external resources such as debt, they also require a large board 
size (Coles, Daniel, Naveen, 2004). 
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Rashid, Dezoysa, Lodh and Rukin (2010) stated that composition deals with the 
presence of outside board members. They examined this relationship in Bangladesh 
using 274 observations. They concluded that there is no relationship between the board 
composition (represented in terms of the presence of independent outside directors) and 
firm performance. A negative relationship between board size and firm performance 
(measured by ROA) was also concluded. These results are due to “information 
asymmetries between outside independent and other directors. Therefore, it is 
supportive that outside independent directors of Bangladeshi firms are not able to 
ensure the checks and balances of accountability and management activities” (Rashid, 
Dezoysa, Lodh and Rukin, 2010: 89). This aspect is quite debatable because several 
studies argue that there is a strong relationship between board composition and the firm 
performance and others argue that there is no relationship at all. These variances may 
be due to external factors such as: corporate law, capital markets law, life cycle of the 
company or different strategies of the companies. However, results are not consistent, 
the firm performance might be affected indirectly by the board based on the quality of 
monitoring. (Dezoysa, Lodh and Rukin, 2010). 
Ebenezer (2017), conducted a study using 137 companies in Nigeria and Ghana 
from 2008 to 2014, to check the relationship between board monitoring and firm 
performance. It was concluded that there is a positive relationship between the intensity 
of board monitoring and firm performance. “Intense monitoring enables directors to be 
informed and better understanding of important developments within the firm, and 
better position to timely take decisions to address emerging critical problems and 
improve performance” (Ebenzer, 2017: 36).  
Brick and Chidambaran (2010) extended previous studies performed by Vafeas 
(1999) and Adams (2005) and conducted it on a larger sample covering the period from 
1999 to 2005 on companies in the United States of America. They examined the 
relationship between board monitoring and firm performance by using the logarithm of 
board meetings and the logarithm of the product of annual board meetings and number 
of independent board members as the measure for board monitoring activity. They also 
added corporate events such as mergers and acquisitions in their study. Moreover, they 
took into consideration the independence of board members, duality of the CEO (when 
the chair and the CEO are the same), external factors that could pressure the firm to 
increase board monitoring activity. They concluded that board monitoring is positively 
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affecting the firm value (represented by Tobin’s Q). Their study also concludes that 
board monitoring does not improve ROA, so the key role of the board is to improve the 
investment opportunities not the current performance of the firm. The positive results 
between board monitoring and Tobin’s Q are because as the board monitoring intensity 
increases, the board will provide more vital advice which will consequently help the 
management of the firm to boost the firm’s investment opportunities and finally 
increase the firm value. Their results also confirm that there is no relationship between 
firm performance and increasing independence of board members. The effects of the 
regulations for the board monitoring depend on the situation. If the board monitoring 
increased to comply with the rules only, in order not to get into trouble, this will 
negatively affect the performance of the firm because the management will concentrate 
on following the rules and will become unfocused on the main goal of the company 
which is maximizing the shareholders’ wealth (Brick and Chidambaran, 2010).  
The variables that are examined in this thesis as measures of board monitoring 
are: number of board meetings and number of board committees. On the other hand, 
number of independent board members and board size are among the control variables 
that are related to board monitoring. Literature review about these variables is discussed 
in the following sub-section of the thesis. 
 
2.2.1 Number of board meetings and firm performance 
 One of the variables that this thesis focuses on is the frequency of board 
meetings. This thesis aims to examine the relationship between number of board 
meetings and firm performance. According to a study that was conducted using data 
from Amman Stock exchange from 2009 to 2013, frequent board meetings lead to 
identifying more issues and collaborative engagement, producing good decisions and 
accordingly enhancing the performance of the firm (Al-Daoud, Saidin, Abidin, 2016). 
Another study was conducted to test the same variable for deposit money banks in 
Nigeria. The study uses Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable representing firm 
performance and number of board meetings as the independent variable and they used 
two control variables: firm size and board size. They argue that there is a positive 
relationship between the number of board meetings and firm performance. The ability 
of board monitoring is getting better, when they meet more frequently and consequently 
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enhances the firm performance and maximizing shareholders’ wealth (Eluyela, 
Akintimehin, okere, Ozordi, Osuma, Ilogho and Oladipo, 2018). 
Johl, Kaur and Cooper (2015), conducted a study on 700 listed Malaysian 
companies which includes financial and non-financial companies in 2009. It was 
concluded that there is a negative relationship between number of board meetings and 
firm performance (ROA). Frequent board meetings direct resources towards activities 
that are not fully productive.  
Kaur and Vij (2017) studied the relationship between board characteristics and 
firm performance. They conducted this study using banks in India for the years between 
2008 and 2014. They concluded that the number of board meetings, has a positive effect 
since the increase in the board meetings will enable the board members to exchange 
more ideas and the management will be more proactive and consequently decision 
making will be improved.  
Another aspect related to board meetings is the attendance of the board of 
directors. The study concluded that if board of directors attend the meetings by 
themselves this affects the performance of the firm positively. On the other hand, if 
they authorize representatives to attend the meeting on their behalf, this would have an 
insignificant negative impact on the firm performance. The board members tend to 
attend the board meetings by themselves when they have higher qualifications which 
consequently affects firm performance positively (Chou, Chung and Yin, 2013).   
Another study was conducted to measure the relationship between the number 
of board meetings and corporate value in South Africa on a sample of 169 listed 
companies covering the period from 2002 to 2007. It was concluded that high frequency 
of board meetings leads to high corporate performance. This happens because when the 
number of board meetings increases, board members can monitor and advise more 
effectively and consequently improve firm performance (Ntim and Osei, 2011). 
Arora and Sharma (2016) studied the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance in India covering the period from 2001 to 2010. The 
study reveals that there is a positive relationship between the frequency of board 
meetings and firm performance. Monitoring will be better by meeting more frequently 
because board members will have more time to debate and discuss more issues.  
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2.2.2 Number of board committees and firm performance 
 There is also a relationship between the board committees and firm 
performance. Most of the research focuses on the relationship between each committee 
and firm performance but there is little research about the relationship between the 
number of committees and firm performance. Lam and Lee (2012) conducted a study 
in Hong Kong for the period between 2001 to 2003 including 346 companies to check 
the relationship between board committees and firm performance. There is a positive 
relationship between nomination committee and firm performance, while there is a 
negative relationship between remuneration committee and firm performance. The 
positive relationship related to the nomination committee is due to higher independence 
of the board members in this committee. The presence of independent board members 
will help the company to achieve good corporate governance practices which will 
consequently enhance firm performance. They also have found that the ownership 
structure affects the results. The family ownership affects the relationship between 
board committees and firm performance negatively in Hong Kong since board 
committees in family businesses usually have family members or directors who are 
executives. The negative relationship related to remuneration committees is because 
“the monitoring function of remuneration committees would be weakened with the 
involvement of executive chairman who is usually from or related to the controlling 
family” (Lam and Lee, 2012: 363). In addition to that, remuneration committee has less 
independent members than nomination committee (Lam and Lee, 2012). 
Hoque, Islam and Azam (2013) conducted a study to check if there is a 
relationship between the frequency of meeting of the board committees and the firm 
performance. They conducted their research on 118 Australian listed companies 
covering the period from 1999 to 2007. It was proved that some of the committees have 
effects on the firm performance while others do not. Firm performance, which is 
measured by ROA and return on equity (ROE), is affected by the frequency of meetings 
of the audit committee and remuneration committee but risk committee does not 
influence firm performance. The positive effect of the audit committee meetings is due 
to that this committee enhances performance of the companies by controlling financial 
risks through enhancing financial reporting. On the other hand, the positive results 
related to the remuneration committees is due to enhancing performance of the firm 
through increasing productivity because of securing higher compensations to managers. 
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In addition to that, they illustrated that there are factors that affect the frequency of 
board committee meetings. Board members are concerned about the firm performance 
since this would affect their reputation or committed and actively attend the board 
committee meetings or have chairman who is eager and requires frequent board 
committee meetings. 
 
2.2.3 Number of independent board members and firm performance 
 Another aspect that affects firm performance is the number of independent 
board members. Arosa, Iturralde and Maseda (2013) conducted a study on 307 small 
and medium sized companies in Spain. They concluded a negative relationship between 
number of independent board members and firm performance. They stated that inside 
directors contribute to better decisions because of their knowledge about the company’s 
processes affecting firm performance positively. Singla and Singh (2019) conducted a 
study for the period from 2007 to 2016 in India. They used a sample of 3,854 firms to 
test the relationship between board monitoring and firm performance in India. They 
represented board monitoring by board independence and the independence of audit 
committee. They concluded that as the board independence increases, firm value (which 
is represented by Tobin’s Q) decreases. Independence of board of directors may be 
affected by the following factors: “adverse selection process (such as the involvement 
of the CEO/promoters in the selection process); subtle linkages between the 
independent directors and the CEO or the company which are too subtle to come under 
the purview of the formal definition  of an independent director; long tenure of the 
independent directors in the firms” (Singla and Singh, 2019: 8). Other factors that may 
contribute to this negative relationship are: sometimes they do not have enough 
experience about the business of the company, they are busy, and they do not have 
enough incentives. On the other hand, there is a positive relationship between 
independence of audit committee and firm value. Their findings were aligned with 
Klein’s results (1998) since the independent directors are valuable when they are placed 
in the right committees (Singla and Singh, 2019). Rashid (2018) conducted a study to 
demonstrate the relationship between board independence and firm performance in 
Bangladesh using 135 companies. Although, it is known that the presence of 
independent members is better to boost shareholders’ goals, it was found that there is 
no positive relationship between board independence and firm performance in 
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Bangladesh. The study stated that insiders are better because they have more valuable 
knowledge about the firm than the outside directors. In addition to that, there may be a 
relationship between the new outsiders who are recommended by insiders. In some 
cases, outsiders are not qualified enough because they do not have enough information 
about the firm as insiders have and most of them are not full-timers. Yasser, Mamun 
and Marcus (2017) conducted a study on companies in Pakistan listed on Karachi stock 
exchange to validate the relationship between board structure and firm performance. 
The study represented firm performance indicator by ROA, ROE and economic value 
added. It was concluded that there is a negative relation between independent board 
members and firm performance. This negative relationship may occur because there are 
no requirements that the independent director should have suitable qualifications and 
experience. 
Ghasemi and Ab Razak (2016) have conducted a study in Malaysia from 2010 
to 2013 using 267 listed companies to test the relationship between executive ratio and 
profitability of the firm. Executive ratio is “the ratio of the executive directors to total 
members on the board” (Ghasemi and Ab Razak, 2016: 3). In Malaysia, companies are 
motivated to have more independent board members, however, it was concluded that 
there was a positive relationship between number of executive and earning per share 
because they have knowledge and experience about the business processes of the firm 
(Ghasemi and Ab Razak, 2016). 
There is another study which was conducted to test the relationship between 
independence of board of directors with the firm performance in Saudi Arabia. They 
used a sample of 329 non-financial listed firms for the years from 2013 to 2015 
(Alshetwi, 2017). It was concluded that there is no relationship between independence 
and firm performance. They suggested that this relationship may be applicable in Saudi 
Arabia because “Saudi Arabia’s structure is influenced by societal norms that are 
heavily influenced by the tribal system and tribal values” (Alshetwi, 2017: 12). Then 
they did further tests that revealed that board independence may affect firm 
performance negatively in Saudi Arabia. This is because “in Saudi business context, 
non-executive members lack real independence from management and represent an 
additional cost burden that outweighs any benefits obtained from them” (Alshetwi, 
2017:12). Johl, Kaur and Cooper (2015), concluded that there is no relationship 
between board independence and firm performance. 
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Ammari, Amdouni, Zemzem and Ellouze (2016) tested the French market by 
conducting a study from 2001 to 2013 using a sample of 80 listed companies. They 
used the two measures for dependent variables which are ROA (as an accounting 
measure for firm performance) and Tobin’s Q (as a market measure for firm 
performance). They used interaction terms for board monitoring variables. These terms 
are: a monitoring committee indicator with board size and a monitoring committee 
indicator with board independence. The monitoring committee indicator takes the value 
of zero or one. It takes one if the number of monitoring committees are at least three. It 
was concluded that there is a negative relationship between independent board members 
and accounting performance if there are at least three committees. This negative impact 
on accounting performance is due to “the high costs incurred by the firm in the case of 
several committees adding to the independent directors’ costs” (Ammari, Amdouni, 
Zemzem and Ellouze, 2016: 10). 
There is another study that checks the relationship between board independence 
and firm performance. They used non-financial listed companies on FTSE 100 for the 
period from 2012 to 2015. The researchers concluded that there was a positive 
relationship between board independence and firm performance (represented by 
Tobin’s Q) due to the mitigation of the agency theory conflicts because of the presence 
of more independent board members and consequently firm performance will improve 
(Alqatan, Chbib, Hussainey, 2019). Kaur and Vij (2017) concluded that having many 
independent members has no effect on efficient board. However, banks need to have 
independent members that have enough knowledge and skills to be able to help the 
executives to run the company well. 
Arora (2012) examined the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance. This study was conducted in India covering the period between 2001 and 
2010. It was concluded that the firm performance was enhanced when there are many 
inside directors on the board. “This relationship can also be attributed to the fact that 
the concept of board independence is a new phenomenon for Indian firms and so, it 
might take few more years to have a momentous impact on firm performance.” (Arora, 
2012: 547).  
Alhussayen and Shabou (2016) conducted a study to examine the relationship 
between board monitoring and firm performance in Saudi Arabia between 2008 to 
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2013. The sample contains the listed companies on stock exchange in Saudi Arabia 
(excluding firms related to banking and insurance sectors). Firm value was represented 
by Tobin’s Q and Market to book ratio (M-B ratio) and the board monitoring was 
represented by the board committees’ independence. These committees are 
remuneration, nomination and audit committees. M-B ratio is calculated by dividing 
the market value of common stock by the book value of common stocks. They 
concluded that there is a positive relationship between board monitoring and firm value. 
They stated that these results show that board of directors is effective in Saudi Arabia 
in terms of their monitoring functions. They also suggested that monitoring provided 
by outside directors is better than monitoring provided by inside directors as “the 
outside board members provide the required monitoring over the firm's managers and 
controlling shareholders and prevent them from misusing the firm's resources” 
(Alhussayen and Shabou, 2016: 149) 
Klein (1998) examined whether there is a relationship between board committee 
structure and firm performance by using a sample of S&P 500 companies. Klein found 
that if the board composition was illustrated by dividing the board members into 
insiders (currently employed by the firm), outsiders and affiliates (they can be relatives 
of the CEO, were employed by the firm but they are no longer employees of the firm, 
they have business relationship with the company), there will be no relationship 
between the firm performance and board composition. On the other hand, “Board 
composition has marginal explanatory value for various performance measure” (Klein, 
1998: 300). The study examines the roles of the board members on different board 
committees. It was found that there is a positive relationship between the existence of 
many insiders in the investment and finance committee and firm performance. It was 
also proved that a company experiences abnormal stock returns if they increased the 
number of inside board members on their finance and investment committees. The 
positive results associated with the presence of insiders are due to their valuable 
knowledge about the business activities (Klein, 1998).   
Arora and Sharma (2016) concluded that independence of board of directors 
affect firm performance negatively. This negative relationship may be because board 
independence is unfamiliar concept in developing countries, accordingly it will take 
time to positively influence firm performance. 
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2.2.4 Board size and firm performance 
 Board size affects firm performance. Ghasemi and Ab Razak (2016) proved that 
there is a positive relationship between the board size and firm profitability because the 
large board size gives more strategic information and increases business connections. 
Alshetwi (2017) concluded that there is no relationship between board size and firm 
performance of non-financial firms in Saudi. Kalsie and Shrivastav (2016) conducted a 
study that measures the relationship between board size and firm performance in India. 
They used a sample 145 companies covering the period from 2008 to 2012. They used 
ROA, Tobin’s Q, Market to book value ratio (MBVR) and return on capital employed 
(ROCE) as measures for firm performance. They concluded that there is a positive 
relationship between board size and firm performance. They believed that the positive 
results of this study support agency theory and resource dependency theory. These 
theories will be discussed later. 
 Johl, Kaur and Cooper (2015) concluded that the larger board size can better 
monitor the management and consequently enhance firm performance. Ammari, 
Amdouni, Zemzem and Ellouze (2016) tested the French market and concluded that 
there is a negative relationship between large board size and market performance. When 
the board size increases, decisions are not appropriately made because of the 
coordination problems they face which consequently affects performance. However, 
there is a positive relationship between board size and accounting performance if there 
are at least three committees. The presence of the committees helps the large board size 
to achieve its goals, since the key role of these committees is to solve coordination 
issues and make sure that all members receive the same information (asymmetric 
information). Alqatan, Chbib, Hussainey (2019) concluded there is a positive 
relationship between board size and firm performance when using ROA as a measure 
of firm performance. The large board size leads to better decision making due to more 
ideas will be generated which will finally enhance firm performance.  
Kaur and Vij (2017) concluded that there is a positive relationship between 
small board size and firm performance. Board size has a negative relationship with firm 
performance due to the difficulty the board face for organization, communication and 
making decisions when they have large board size which ultimately affects firm 
performance.  
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 Arora (2012) showed that there is a positive relationship between board size and 
firm performance if they used Tobin’s Q as measure of firm performance. Tobin’s Q is 
enhanced by having large board size, since the firm will have more qualifications and 
experience which will enhance decision making. However, there is a negative relation 
between them when Arora used ROA as firm performance indicator. Arora justified 
that this negative relationship, which is different from other studies’ findings, may be 
because this study is conducted specifically for pharmaceutical industry. It was also 
proved that there is a positive relationship between number of board meetings and firm 
performance by using both measures ROA and Tobin’s Q. The positive results 
associated with large board size and increase in the number of meetings are due to 
collective experience and knowledge which lead to better decision making and 
improved firm performance.  
 There was a study conducted in Pakistan to test the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. The period covered was from 2010 to 
2014 using 80 non-financial firms in Pakistan. They concluded that there is a positive 
relationship between board size and firm performance. They believed that these results 
are aligned with the resource dependence theory. (Muhammad, Rehman, Waqas, 2016). 
Yasser, Mamun and Marcus (2017) concluded there was a positive relationship 
between board size and firm performance because as the board size increases, 
monitoring activity increases, because of the various experiences of the board members 
which will consequently enhances the firm performance. 
Arora and Sharma (2016) concluded that there is a negative relationship 
between board size and ROA. They believed that this negative relationship is due to the 
difficulty in communication, coordination and the free riding issues associated with the 
increase in the number of board of directors. 
 
2.3 Theories 
There are numerous theories that deal with the relationship between board of 
directors and firm performance. These theories are agency theory, resource dependency 
theory and stewardship theory. As previously mentioned agency theory interprets the 
relationship between principal and agent. This theory states that large board size is 
better for firm performance because board of directors will work towards the interests 
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of the shareholders and consequently enhance firm performance. Resource dependency 
theory deals with the behavior change of the organization to utilize external resources. 
This theory stated that larger board size is better since more experience in different 
fields will be available for the firm and consequently enhance its performance. On the 
other hand, another theory that favors small board size is the stewardship theory (Kalsie 
and Shrivastav, 2016). “The stewardship theory documents that the managers, when 
left on their own, act as responsible stewards of the assets they control” (Kalsie and 
Shrivastav, 2016: 149). This theory supports that the managers do not need to be 
monitored by large board size and a small board is enough to monitor their performance 
(Kalsie and Shrivastav, 2016). Makhlouf, Laili, Basah and Ramli (2017) stated that 
according to previous research, two theories are related to the relationship between 
board of directors and firm performance which are the agency theory and resource 
dependency theory. Agency theory states that the key role of the board of directors is to 
monitor the management and to mitigate the conflicts between the management of the 
company and the shareholders because of their different interests. On the other hand, 
resource dependency theory suggests that the board of directors are considered as 
resources for the firm. They could improve its performance through providing the firm 
with expertise, maintain good external relationships and give advice to the management 
of the company. Agency theory suggests that there is a positive relationship between 
independent board of directors and firm performance since they will monitor the 
management without prejudice and provide the firm with their expertise in different 
areas. In terms of board size, agency theory states that there is a negative relationship 
between board size and firm performance. Smaller size is better because as board size 
increases, difficulty in decision making process will also increases because of the 
complexity to make large board size agree on the same decision (Makhlouf, Laili, Basah 
and Ramli, 2017).There is conflict between the findings of Makhlouf, Laili, Basah and 
Ramli’s  and Kalsie and Shrivastav’s research regarding the agency theory and its 
relation with board size. Makhlouf, Laili, Basah and Ramli (2017) states that resource 
dependency theory supports a positive relationship between board size and firm 
performance since the presence of large board size from various backgrounds enhances 
decision making and consequently improves firm performance. Regarding frequency 
of board meetings, agency theory states that increasing the number of board meetings 
is better, since monitoring will improve which enhances the firm performance. On the 
other hand, stewardship theory suggests that the relationship between number of board 
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meetings and firm performance may be negative because “the board of directors’ 
meetings are irrelevant to the implementation of a board’s governance obligations 
because monitoring is an entirely endogenous process” (Makhlouf, Laili, Basah and 
Ramli, 2017: 25).  
 
2.4 Summary of the literature review 
 
Appendix 1 summarizes the studies that were covered in the previous 
literature review section. These studies focus on measuring the relationship between 
board monitoring and firm performance. 
3. Research methodology 
   
3.1 Sample size and data 
 
This thesis measures the relationship between board monitoring (independent 
variable) and firm performance (dependent variable). The sample size is based on the 
Financial Times and London Stock Exchange (FTSE) top 150 listed companies for the 
period from 2013 to 2017. FTSE includes the largest listed companies on London Stock 
Exchange (LSE). It manages Exchange traded funds (ETF), bonds, derivatives and 
international equity (London Stock Exchange Group, 2018). The most popular index is 
FTSE 100. However, there are also FTSE  150 and FTSE 250. This thesis focuses on 
FTSE 150 which includes the largest 150 listed companies on LSE (FTSE, 2018). FTSE 
150 is used in this thesis based on the availability of governance data related to board 
members. FTSE index was designed to signify the performance of companies in the 
UK which helps investors to comprehend the performance of the UK equity market 
(FTSE Statistics, 2018). 
 The board data is from Spencer and Stuart which is a big consulting firm that 
has 60 years of experience. It provides insights about how to select, evaluate and 
increase the effectiveness of executives. It focuses on providing information about key 
elements of boards which play an essential role in corporate governance trends. It 
formulates a board index which explores the trends and the challenges facing boards in 
various corporations. Examples of the most recent board index reports were: 2018 US 
Spencer Stuart board index, 2018 Spain Spencer Stuart board index and 2018 France 
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Spencer Stuart Board Index (Board Governance Trends: A Global View, 2018). The 
financial data is from Thomson Reuters database and the audit type data is from S&P 
Capital IQ database.  
 
3.2 Model 
 
The dependent variable is the firm performance which is measured by Tobin’s 
Q (Total market value of the firm divided by total asset value of the firm) and return on 
assets (ROA)1. This thesis uses ROA as an accounting measure and Tobin’s Q as market 
performance measure. Tobin’s Q gives indication about the market value of the firm. 
The independent variables are the number of board meetings and number of board 
committees. Control variables are: number of independent board members, board size, 
company size, leverage, sector/industry and audit type. R software is used in the 
analysis. 
Accordingly, this thesis focuses on testing two models. The first model includes 
the first dependent variable (ROA) with all independent and control variables.  The 
second model includes the second dependent variable (Tobin’s Q) with all independent 
and control variables. The below equations are used to examine the two models: 
𝑌௜௧ଵ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ 𝑋ଵ + 𝛽ଶ 𝑋ଶ + 𝛽ଷ:଼𝑋ଷ:଼ + 𝜀௜௧ 
𝑌௜௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ 𝑋ଵ + 𝛽ଶ 𝑋ଶ + 𝛽ଷ:଼𝑋ଷ:଼ + 𝜀௜௧ 
Where: 
𝑌௜௧ଵ  = ROA (Net income/Average total assets) 
𝑌௜௧ଶ  = Tobin’s Q (Total market value of firm/Total asset value of firm) 
𝑋ଵ:ଶ = Independent variables (discussed in Table 1) 
𝑋ଷ:଼ = Control variables (discussed in Table 1) 
𝛽଴  = Intercept. 
𝛽ଵ:଼= Regression model coefficients. 
𝜀௜௧ = Error term. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 ROE was tested but the results were insignificant. 
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Table 1: Definition of independent variables 
Category X Variable  Variable 
name 
Calculation Source 
Board 
variable 
 
𝑋ଵ Number of 
board 
meetings  
nmeeting N/A Spencer 
and 
stuart 
𝑋ଶ Number of 
board 
committees  
Nbcom N/A Spencer 
and 
stuart 
Control 
Variable 
 
𝑋ଷ Number of 
independent 
board 
members 
Nib N/A Spencer 
and 
stuart 
𝑋ସ  Board size Board size N/A Spencer 
and 
stuart 
𝑋ହ Company size 
 
Employees Number of 
employees 
Thomson 
Reuters 
𝑋଺ Leverage Leverage Total debt % 
/Common Equity 
Thomson 
Reuters 
𝑋଻ Sector / 
Industry 
 
Industry  1= financial 
services sector 
0=non-financial 
services sector 
Thomson 
Reuters 
𝑋଼ Audit type Audit 1 = audited by one 
of the Big- four 
0= not audited by 
one of the Big -four 
S&P 
capital 
IQ 
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4. Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
  
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the data which shows the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, maximum and number of observation. The average value for ROA 
is 9.645 with a maximum of 269.11 and a minimum of -21.58. The average value for 
Tobin’s Q is 0.002 with a maximum of 0.071 and a minimum of 0.00001. The average 
number of board meetings is 8 meetings with a minimum of 2 meetings and a maximum 
of 23 meetings. In terms of board committees, they have average of approximately 4 
committees. The maximum number is 7 committees while the minimum is 3 
committees. The average number of independent board members is 6 with a maximum 
of 15 and a minimum of 2. While the average board size is 10 members with a maximum 
of 20 and minimum of 5. The average number of employees is 42,128 employees. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max N 
ROA 9.645 22.296 -21.580 269.11 698 
Tobin’s Q 0.002 0.005 0.00001 0.071 734 
Nbmeeting 8.167 2.498 2 23 744 
Nbcom 3.801 0.866 3 7 745 
Nib 6.181 2.021 2 15 745 
Board size 10.254 2.317 5 20 745 
Employees 42,128 83,990 12 631,465 738 
 
4.2 Correlation 
 
4.2.1 Pearson correlation 
 
Table 3 shows Pearson correlation coefficient matrix for the sample. The correlation 
matrix shows that there is a negative correlation between ROA and leverage and 
number of board meetings. There is a significant negative correlation between ROA 
and number of board committees, number of independent board members, board size 
and number of employees. There is a negative correlation between Tobin’s Q and 
number of board meetings, number of employees and leverage. There is a significant 
negative correlation between Tobin’s Q and number of board committees, number of 
independent board members and board size. The correlation matrix also shows that 
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there is a strong positive correlation between number of board committees and number 
of board meetings, number of independent, board size and number of employees. 
Table 3: Pearson Correlation Coefficient matrix 
  nbmeeting nbcom nib 
Board 
size ROA 
Tobin’s
Q employees leverage 
nbmeeting Pearson 
Correlation 
1               
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
                
N 744               
nbcom Pearson 
Correlation 
.177** 1             
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.000               
N 744 745             
nib Pearson 
Correlation 
.074* .399** 1           
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.045 0.000             
N 744 745 745           
board_size Pearson 
Correlation 
0.042 .312** .83
1** 
1         
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.254 0.000 0.0
00 
          
N 744 745 745 745         
ROA Pearson 
Correlation 
-0.044 -.157** -
.12
6** 
-.121** 1       
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.245 0.000 0.0
01 
0.001         
N 697 698 698 698 698       
Tobin’s Q Pearson 
Correlation 
-0.020 -.156** -
.11
8** 
-.110** .959*
* 
1     
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.595 0.000 0.0
01 
0.003 0.00
0 
      
N 733 734 734 734 693 734     
employees Pearson 
Correlation 
0.057 .213** .26
1** 
.187** -
.093* 
-0.070 1   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.126 0.000 0.0
00 
0.000 0.01
5 
0.060     
N 728 728 728 728 685 721 728   
leverage Pearson 
Correlation 
0.042 -0.039 0.0
04 
0.010 -
0.01
8 
-0.026 0.004 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.257 0.300 0.9
07 
0.792 0.64
4 
0.493 0.909   
N 714 715 715 715 676 712 706 715 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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4.2.2 Chi-Square test 
 
 The two variables: audit and industry are categorical variables. Accordingly, 
correlation test was carried out to examine them. The relevant test is the Chi-Square 
test. Two hypotheses were formulated to be tested as shown in the below equations: 
𝐻଴ = 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝐻ଵ = 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 
  The Pearson’s Chi-squared test with Yates' continuity correction shows that x-squared 
is 0.097654, the degrees of freedom equals to 1 and p-value equals to 0.7547. The 
results show that as the p-value is greater than 0.05 so we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis which means that audit and industry are independent. 
 
4.3 Results of model 1 
 
 In the first model, the relationship between board monitoring and firm 
performance (represented by ROA) was examined as shown in the below equation2: 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ 𝑛𝑏𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽ଶ 𝑛𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑚 + 𝛽ଷ 𝑛𝑖𝑏
+ 𝛽ସ  𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽ହ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽଺ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽଻ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝛽଼ 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀௜௧  
 
Where the definitions of the variables were provided in Table 1. 
 Firstly, the heterogeneity was examined to check if the selected sample has 
some differences across the companies and time. Means are almost the same across 
years as shown in Figure 1. However, ROA does not have equal means across different 
companies. Few companies were different from the rest (almost all the companies have 
the same average) as shown in Figure 2. Accordingly, these figures suggest the use of 
panel data to incorporate the effects of different companies on the ROA. 
                                                            
2 There was no multicollinearity between variables. 
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Figure 1. Heterogeneity across years in terms of ROA. 
 
 
Figure 2. Heterogeneity across companies in terms of ROA. 
Different models were examined to reach the best model. Time effect was 
ignored in the first trial. On the other hand, companies’ effects were taken into 
consideration as shown in Appendix 2. The results of the first trial shows that 
companies are significant and have influence on ROA. The second trial was 
incorporating time effect into the model. The time was insignificant (as shown in 
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Appendix 3), so time can be ignored in the model. Another model was examined which 
is OLS. It was used to ignore time and companies’ effect (refer to Appendix 4) showing 
that the significant variables are number of board committees and leverage. The results 
of the three trials show that time does not have an effect, however companies have 
influence on ROA. Accordingly, fixed model was used to incorporate the companies as 
factors to check for the individual fixed effects (companies’ effects) (as shown in 
Appendix 5). F test also was carried out to check if fixed model or ordinary least squares 
(OLS) was better (as shown in Appendix 6), and the conclusion was that fixed model 
is better since the p-value was less than 0.05. Backward elimination method was used 
to reach to the best model. Backward elimination is a process in which insignificant 
variables will be removed gradually until the best model will be reached with the 
significant variables. Accordingly, insignificant variables were removed gradually until 
we reach the best model to measure the effect of the independent variables on ROA. 
The first model that includes all the independent variables (before using the backward 
elimination method) was as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: Fixed model results with ROA 
Unbalanced Panel: n = 180, T = 1-5, N = 681 
Observations used in estimation: 180 
Residuals:  
Min.    1st Qu.     Median 3rd Qu.       Max. 
-30.32926  -5.40913   -0.75183     3.17023  234.92089  
Coefficients:  
       Esimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)  
Intercept          34.7302771 14.0002955   2.4807 0.014080 * 
Audit        3.0091357 10.9208493 0.2755 0.783234 
board size -1.1867578   1.2963523 -0.9155 0.361240 
Industry -1.8909339 4.0937127 -0.4619 0.644732 
Leverage -0.0261351   0.0083903 -3.1149 0.002158 ** 
Nbcom -3.4809019   2.2503888 -1.5468 0.123760 
Employees 0.0082303   0.0075488 1.0903 0.277126 
Nib 0.7199976   1.5532249 0.4636 0.643560 
nbmeeting -0.2955304   0.7341947 -0.4025 0.687802 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Total Sum of Squares:    68979 
Residual Sum of Squares: 62810 
R-Squared:      0.089422 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.046822 
F-statistic: 2.09911 on 8 and 171 DF, p-value: 0.038333 
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P-value was less than 0.05 so the model is significant. In this model, leverage 
was a significant variable. Also, there is a negative association between number of 
board meetings and number of board committees with ROA. By applying the backward 
elimination method to remove the insignificant variables and reach the best model. The 
results were as shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Fixed model results with ROA after applying backward elimination 
Unbalanced Panel: n = 182, T = 1-5, N = 698 
Observations used in estimation: 182 
Residuals:  
Min.    1st Qu.     Median 3rd Qu.       Max. 
-31.91714   -5.55019   -0.79087    2.71896 235.83527 
Coefficients:  
        Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)    
Intercept          33.277456
1   
7.4572416   4.4624 1.43e-05 *** 
Leverage -0.025363
0   
0.0080061 -3.1680 0.001805 ** 
Nbcom -4.316923
5   
1.8398920 -2.3463 0.020056 *   
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Total Sum of Squares:    68982 
Residual Sum of Squares: 63578 
R-Squared:      0.07833 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.068032 
F-statistic: 7.60631 on 2 and 179 DF, p-value: 0.00067533 
 
 
 P-value was less than 0.05 which makes the model significant. The significant 
variables were number of board committees and leverage. The results show that by 
using ROA, there is no significant relationship between number of board meetings and 
firm performance but there is a negative significant relationship between number of 
board committees and firm performance. This means that as number of board 
committees and leverage increase, ROA decreases. Based on the results of Pearson 
correlation matrix, there is a positive association between number of board committees 
and board size which means that as the number of board committees increases, board 
size increases. Accordingly, the negative relationship associated with increase in the 
number of board committees is consistent with Bachiller, Giorgino and Paternostro’s 
27 
 
(2014) and Kaur and Vij’s (2017) findings. They believed that increasing board size 
negatively affects firm performance because of the concept of free riders. Also, Arora 
and Sharma (2016) believed that there is a negative relationship between board size and 
ROA because of difficulty in communication, coordination and the free riding issues. 
In addition to that, this negative relationship may be due to the appointment of directors 
who are busy outside directors (holding more than one directorship). Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) stated that busy directors are more likely to result in weak 
governance which consequently affects the firm performance negatively. Busy 
directors will not be able to effectively monitor the performance of the firm because 
they will be unfocused, and monitoring activity will decline. 
 
4.4 Results of model 2 
 
In the second model, the relationship between board monitoring and firm 
performance (represented by Tobin’s Q) was examined as shown in the below equation: 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ 𝑛𝑏𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽ଶ 𝑛𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑚 + 𝛽ଷ 𝑛𝑖𝑏
+ 𝛽ସ  𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽ହ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽଺ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽଻ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝛽଼ 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀௜௧  
Where the definitions of the variables were provided in Table 1. 
 Firstly, the heterogeneity across the companies and time was examined. Figure 
3 show that means are almost the same across years. However, Tobin’s Q does not have 
equal means across different companies. Few companies are different from the rest as 
shown in Figure 4. Accordingly, panel data was suggested to be used to incorporate the 
effects of different companies on Tobin’s Q. 
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Figure 3: Heterogeneity across years in terms of Tobin’s Q. 
 
 
Figure 4. Heterogeneity across companies in terms of Tobin’s Q. 
 
Different models were examined to reach the best model with Tobin’s Q. Time 
effect was ignored in the first trial and companies’ effect were considered. Accordingly, 
it was found that companies influence Tobin’s Q (as shown in Appendix 7). The second 
trial was incorporating time effect into the model. The time was insignificant (as shown 
in Appendix 8). OLS was used to ignore both time and companies’ effect (refer to 
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Appendix 9). The results of the three trials show that time does not have an effect, 
however companies have influence on Tobin’s Q. Accordingly, fixed model was used 
to incorporate the companies as factors check for the individual fixed (Appendix 10). F 
test also was carried out to check if fixed model or ordinary least squares was better (as 
shown in Appendix 11), and the conclusion was that fixed model is better since the p-
value was less than 0.05. Then backward elimination technique was used to reach the 
best model (as discussed in the previous section). The first model that includes all the 
independent variables (before using the backward elimination method) are as shown in 
Table 6. 
Table 6: Fixed model results with Tobin’s Q 
Unbalanced Panel: n = 188, T = 1-5, N = 716 
Observations used in estimation: 188 
Residuals:  
Min.    1st Qu.     Median 3rd Qu.       Max. 
-0.00321954 -0.00134079 -0.00034736    0.00050149   0.05775967 
Coefficients:  
     Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)    
Intercept          6.1709e-03   3.3011e-03   1.8693 0.063212 
Audit        4.9796e-04   2.5953e-03   0.1919 0.848060    
board size -1.5570e-04   3.0414e-04 -0.5119 0.609330    
Industry -6.7251e-04   9.0663e-04 -0.7418 0.459200    
Leverage -5.8296e-06   1.9640e-06 -2.9682 0.003405 ** 
 
Nbcom -9.2654e-04   5.1444e-04 -1.8011 0.073377 
Employees 2.0074e-06 1.7668e-06 1.1362 0.257400 
Nib 8.3892e-05   3.6113e-04 0.2323 0.816566 
nbmeeting 9.0999e-05 1.7099e-04 0.5322 0.595259 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Total Sum of Squares:    0.0040475 
Residual Sum of Squares: 0.0037148 
R-Squared:      0.082192 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.041173 
F-statistic: 2.00374 on 8 and 179 DF, p-value: 0.04837 
 
 
P-value was less than 0.05 so the model is significant. The significant variable 
was leverage. Also, there is a positive relationship between number of board meetings 
and firm performance. On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between 
number of board committees and firm performance. The relationship between number 
of board meetings and firm performance differed based on the measure of firm 
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performance which was used. By using ROA, the relationship was negative while the 
relationship was positive by using Tobin’s Q. Then the backward elimination method 
was used to remove the insignificant variables and reach the best model. The results are 
as shown in Table 7. 
Table 7: Fixed model results with Tobin’s Q after applying backward elimination 
Unbalanced Panel: n = 191, T = 1-5, N = 734 
Observations used in estimation: 191 
Residuals:  
Min.    1st Qu.     Median 3rd Qu.       Max. 
-0.00307041 -0.001218
01 
-0.00028878   0.00045478   0.05821628 
Coefficients:  
        Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)    
Intercept          7.1256e-0
3   
1.7044e-03 4.1806 4.452e-05 *** 
Leverage -5.2601e-0
6 
1.8529e-06 -2.8389 0.005024 ** 
Nbcom -1.0341e-0
3 
4.1406e-04 -2.4974 0.013370 * 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Total Sum of Squares:    0.0040506 
Residual Sum of Squares: 0.0037723 
R-Squared:      0.068714 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.058807 
F-statistic: 6.93572 on 2 and 188 DF, p-value: 0.0012411 
 
 
P-value was less than 0.05 which makes the model significant. The variables 
which are significant in this model were number of board committees and leverage. The 
results suggest that there is no significant relationship between number of board 
meetings and firm performance but there is a negative significant relationship between 
number of board committees and firm performance (Tobin’s Q). This means that as 
number of board committees and leverage decreases, Tobin’s Q increases. Based on the 
results of Pearson correlation matrix, there is a positive association between number of 
board committees and board size. Accordingly, the negative relationship between 
number of board committees and firm performance is consistent with Ammari, 
Amdouni, Zemzem and Ellouze’s (2016) findings that support a negative relationship 
between board size and market performance measure (Tobin’s Q) because as the board 
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size increases, firm performance decreases, because of the coordination problems 
which affects the ability of the board members to make proper decisions. 
5.Conclusion 
 
Corporate governance is an essential pillar for companies. There are several 
definitions of corporate governance. This thesis focused on theedefinition in which 
corporate governance is “a set of predefined rules which guide the actions of managers 
resulting in the best interest of investors” (Srivastava, Das and Pattanayak, 2018: 2). 
One of the principles of corporate governance is board of directors and their roles 
(OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2015). Board of directors is a mechanism 
that is used to mitigate conflicts between shareholders and management. Various 
aspects regarding the board of directors were covered by previous research such as 
board diversity and board structure. There are few research studies about number of 
board committees and firm performance.  
Previous studies tried to test if there was a relationship between board of 
directors and the firm performance. This thesis examined the relationship between 
board monitoring and firm performance. Board monitoring was measured by the 
number of board meetings and number of board committees. Firm performance was 
measured by an accounting measure (ROA) and market performance measure (Tobin’s 
Q). The sample was FTSE 150 for the years from 2013 to 2017. Control variables were: 
number of independent board members, board size, leverage, audit, industry and 
number of employees. The results showed that there was no significant relationship 
between number of board meetings and firm performance. There was a negative 
association between number of board meetings and ROA but there was a positive 
relationship between number of board meetings and Tobin’s Q. However, there was a 
significant negative relationship between number of board committees and firm 
performance (by using ROA and Tobin’s Q). In addition to that, there was a positive 
association between number of board committees and board size. Accordingly, as the 
number of board committees increases, board size increases. This suggested that the 
negative relationship between number of board committees and firm performance may 
be due the increase in board size which leads the coordination, communication and free-
riders problems that hindered the board of directors to monitor the management 
properly and consequently affected the firm performance negatively. The negative 
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relationship implies that number of board meetings and number of board committees 
are not as important as the capabilities of the board members to apply rules and 
procedures to achieve good corporate governance practices and consequently enhance 
firm performance. Further research could add other board of directors’ characteristics 
such as: level of education, CEO tenure, CFO tenure and CEO duality. There was a 
limitation on the level of education of the board of directors since there is no available 
data on previous board members qualifications.  
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List of appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary of the literature review 
 
The following Table summarizes the studies that were covered in the previous literature review section. These studies focus to measure the 
relationship between board monitoring and firm performance. 
Study Years  Country Dependent variables 
Independent 
variables Results 
Brick and 
Chidambaran (2010) 
1999 to 
2005 
United States 
of America 
ROA, Tobin’s Q 
and price per share 
(PPS)  
 
-logarithm of 
board meetings  
- logarithm of the 
product of annual 
board meetings 
and number of 
independent 
board members 
-Independence of 
board members  
-Duality of the 
CEO 
-Board monitoring is 
positively affecting the 
firm value 
38 
 
Chou, Chung and 
Yin (2013) 
2006 and 
2007 
 
 
 
 
Taiwan 
-ROA, EPS 
(earning per share), 
Sales to assets 
ratio, Sales growth 
rate 
-Percentage of 
board meetings 
attended by a 
director 
himself/herself 
-Percentage of 
meetings attended 
by the authorized 
representatives of 
the director” 
-Positive effect: if board of 
directors attend the 
meetings by themselves -
Negative effect: if they 
authorize representatives to 
attend the meeting on 
behalf of them. 
Arora and Sharma 
(2016) 
2001 to 
2010 
 
 
 
 
India 
ROA, ROE, net 
profit margin 
(NPM), Tobin’s Q, 
Stock returns (SR) 
-Board size 
-Board meeting 
frequency  
-Outside 
directors. 
-Positive effect: between 
the frequency of board 
meetings and firm 
performance. 
 -Negative effect: between 
board size and return on 
assets, between   
Independence of board of 
directors and firm 
performance  
Ntim and Osei 
(2011) 
2002-
2007 
 
 
South Africa Tobin’s Q, ROA, TSR (Total 
shareholder return) 
-Number of board 
meetings, Natural 
log of the total 
number of board 
meetings in a 
year) 
-High frequency of board 
meetings leads to high 
corporate performance 
39 
 
Klein (1998) 1992 and 1993 
United States 
of America 
(Companies 
listed on S&P 
500) 
ROA, Jensen 
productivity (It is 
equal to the change 
in market value of 
equity minus a 
benchmark return 
on investment), 
Market returns 
-Board committee 
structure 
- No relationship: between 
the firm performance and 
board composition. 
- Board composition has 
marginal explanatory value 
for various performance 
measure 
Hoque, Islam and 
Azam (2013) 
1999 to 
2007 
 
 
Australia ROE, ROA 
-Different board 
committees 
meetings` 
frequency 
- It was proved that some 
of the committees have 
effects on the firm 
performance while others 
do not 
Ebenezer (2017) 2008 to 2014 
Nigeria and 
Ghana -ROA, Tobin’s Q 
-Board meetings 
frequency 
-A Positive relationship: 
between the intensity of 
board monitoring and firm 
performance 
Alhussayen and 
Shabou (2016) 
2008 to 
2013 
 
 
Saudi Arabia -Tobin’s Q, M-B 
ratio 
- Board 
committees’ 
independence 
- A Positive relationship: 
between board monitoring 
and firm value. 
Al-Daoud, Saidin, 
Abidin (2016) 
2009 to 
2013 
 
 
Amman -Tobin’s Q, ROA -Frequency of board meetings 
- A Positive relationship: 
between frequency of 
board meetings and firm 
performance  
40 
 
Eluyela, 
Akintimehin,okere,
Ozordi, Osuma, 
Ilogho and Oladipo 
(2018) 
2011 to 
2016 
 
 
Nigeria Tobin’s Q -Number of board meetings 
- A Positive relationship: 
between the number of 
board meetings and firm 
performance 
Arosa, Iturralde and 
Maseda (2013) 2006 Spain -ROA 
Board size, 
Number of board 
meetings 
- A Negative relationship: 
between number of 
independent board 
members and firm 
performance 
-A Negative relationship: 
between board size and 
firm performance. 
Singla and Singh 
(2019) 
2007 to 
2016 
 
 
 
India Tobin’s Q 
- board 
independence and 
the independence 
of audit 
committee 
-A Negative relationship: 
between board 
independence and firm 
performance 
-A Positive relationship: 
between independence of 
audit committee and firm 
value 
Rashid (2018) 2006-2011 
 
 
Bangladesh -Tobin’s Q, ROA 
-Board 
independence  
 
- No positive relationship: 
between board 
independence and firm 
performance 
41 
 
Yasser, Mamun and 
Marcus (2017) 
2009 to 
2013 
 
 
 
Pakistan 
-ROA,ROE 
,Economic value 
added 
-Number of 
independent 
members 
- Board size 
-A Positive relationship: 
between board size and 
firm performance.  
-A Negative relationship: 
between independent board 
members and firm 
performance 
Lam and Lee (2012) 2001 to 2003 
 
 
 
 
Hong Kong 
-ROA, ROE, 
return on capital 
employed (ROCE), 
market-to-book 
value of 
equity(MTBV) 
-Board 
committees (the 
presence of 
remuneration 
committee and 
the presence of 
nomination 
committee) 
- A Negative relationship: 
between remuneration 
committee and firm 
performance.  
- A Positive relationship: 
between nomination 
committee and firm 
performance 
Ghasemi and Ab 
Razak (2016) 
2010 to 
2013 
 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia 
-Earning per share 
-Board size 
-Executive ratio 
is (the ratio of the 
executive 
directors to total 
members on the 
board) 
 
- A Positive relationship: 
between the board size ad 
firm profitability 
- A Positive relationship: 
between number of 
executive and earning per 
share 
Alshetwi (2017) 2013 to 2015 
 
 
Saudi Arabia -ROA 
 
-Board size 
-Board 
independence 
- A Negative relationship: 
between board 
independence and firm 
performance  
- No relationship :between 
board size and firm  
42 
 
Kalsie and 
Shrivastav (2016) 
2008 to 
2012 
 
 
 
India 
-ROA, Tobin’s Q, -
Market to book 
value ratio 
(MBVR), return on 
capital employed 
(ROCE) 
-Board size 
- A Positive  
relationship: between board 
size and firm performance. 
 
Johl, Kaur and 
Cooper (2015) 2009 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia -ROA 
-Board meetings, 
board size, board 
independence and 
experience of 
board of directors 
in accounting 
-No relationship: 
between board 
independence and firm 
performance – A Positive 
relationship: between 
experience of board of 
directors in accounting, 
board size and firm 
performance 
Ammari, Amdouni, 
Zemzem and 
Ellouze (2016) 
2001 to 
2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
France -ROA, Tobin’s Q 
-Monitoring 
committee 
indicator with 
board size  
-Monitoring 
committee 
indicator with 
board 
independence 
-A Negative relationship: 
between large board size 
and market performance. -
A Positive relationship: 
between board size and 
accounting performance if 
there are at least three 
committees.  
-A Negative relationship: 
between large number of 
independent board 
members and accounting 
performance if there are at 
least three committees  
43 
 
 
Alqatan,Chbib, 
Hussainey (2019) 
2012 to 
2015 
 
 
 
 
United 
Kingdom -ROA, Tobin’s Q 
-Board 
independence 
-Board size 
-Board 
remuneration 
-A Positive relationship: 
between board size and 
firm performance, between 
board remuneration 
and firm performance, 
between board 
independence and firm 
performance  
 
 
Kaur and Vij (2017) 2008 to 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
India 
-ROA, Tobin’s Q, 
Net interest 
income, ROE 
-Independent 
members 
-Board size 
-frequency of 
board meetings 
-Number of 
females director 
- “percentage of 
meetings attended 
by the board of 
directors” 
-A Positive relationship: 
between small board size, 
more female members on 
the board, high numbers of 
board meetings and firm 
performance.  
44 
 
Arora (2012) 2001 to 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
India -ROA, Tobin’s Q 
-Number of board 
meetings 
-Board size  
-Outside board 
members 
-A Positive relationship: 
between board size and 
firm performance if they 
used Tobin Q as measure 
of firm performance.  
-A Negative relationship: 
between board size and 
firm performance when 
they used ROA as firm 
performance indicator.  
-A Positive relationship: 
between inside directors 
and firm performance, 
between  
number of board meetings 
and firm performance  
 
Muhammad, 
Rehman,Waqas 
(2016) 
2010 to 
2014 
 
 
 
 
 
Pakistan -ROA, ROE 
-Board 
composition -
Board size 
- CEO duality  
-Presence of audit 
committee 
-A Positive relationship: 
between board size and 
firm performance 
-A Negative relationship: 
between CEO duality, 
board composition and 
firm performance 
-A Positive relationship 
between audit committee 
and firm performance 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: ROA output without time effect 
The following output shows the results for ROA ignoring time effect. 
summary(olswt) 
Call: 
lm(formula = ROA ~ +as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) +  
    as.factor(industry) + as.numeric(leverage) + as.numeric(nbcom) +  
    as.numeric(employees) + as.factor(company) + as.numeric(nib) +  
    as.numeric(nbmeeting), data = mydata) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-26.168  -1.293   0.000   1.397  40.868  
 
Coefficients: 
                         Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)             2.327e+01  1.132e+01   2.056 0.040302 *   
as.numeric(Audit)      -1.112e+00  8.359e+00  -0.133 0.894194     
as.numeric(board_size)  4.002e-01  3.824e-01   1.046 0.295850     
as.factor(industry)1   -1.127e+00  3.350e+00  -0.337 0.736569     
as.numeric(leverage)    5.127e-04  1.660e-03   0.309 0.757522     
as.numeric(nbcom)      -9.520e-01  7.764e-01  -1.226 0.220703     
as.numeric(employees)  -9.171e-04  2.126e-03  -0.431 0.666366     
as.factor(company)2     1.258e+00  6.017e+00   0.209 0.834514     
as.factor(company)3    -6.650e+00  3.538e+00  -1.879 0.060770 .   
as.factor(company)4    -7.991e+00  5.036e+00  -1.587 0.113188     
as.factor(company)5    -5.752e+00  3.738e+00  -1.539 0.124520     
as.factor(company)6    -1.087e+01  5.208e+00  -2.087 0.037439 *   
as.factor(company)8    -1.705e+01  4.954e+00  -3.442 0.000626 *** 
as.factor(company)9    -1.231e+01  5.022e+00  -2.452 0.014572 *   
as.factor(company)10    1.266e+00  5.348e+00   0.237 0.813002     
as.factor(company)11    5.116e+00  4.743e+00   1.079 0.281225     
as.factor(company)12   -9.118e+00  4.950e+00  -1.842 0.066066 .   
as.factor(company)13   -1.144e+01  4.978e+00  -2.297 0.022031 *   
as.factor(company)14   -1.131e+01  4.921e+00  -2.298 0.021998 *   
as.factor(company)15    1.933e+01  5.830e+00   3.316 0.000981 *** 
as.factor(company)16   -1.393e+01  3.591e+00  -3.880 0.000119 *** 
as.factor(company)17   -9.878e+00  6.946e+00  -1.422 0.155662     
as.factor(company)18   -1.258e+01  5.102e+00  -2.465 0.014024 *   
as.factor(company)19   -1.280e+01  4.905e+00  -2.610 0.009329 **  
as.factor(company)20   -1.374e+01  3.712e+00  -3.701 0.000239 *** 
as.factor(company)21   -1.064e+01  4.873e+00  -2.183 0.029470 *   
as.factor(company)22   -1.423e+01  6.952e+00  -2.047 0.041160 *   
as.factor(company)23   -3.631e+00  5.342e+00  -0.680 0.496987     
as.factor(company)24   -6.477e+00  5.077e+00  -1.276 0.202613     
as.factor(company)26   -9.937e+00  5.076e+00  -1.958 0.050804 .   
as.factor(company)27   -9.724e+00  5.413e+00  -1.797 0.073018 .   
as.factor(company)28   -1.141e+01  5.333e+00  -2.139 0.032918 *   
as.factor(company)29    4.318e+00  4.949e+00   0.873 0.383329     
as.factor(company)30   -9.426e+00  5.027e+00  -1.875 0.061365 .   
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as.factor(company)32   -5.381e+00  5.005e+00  -1.075 0.282846     
as.factor(company)33   -1.473e+01  5.784e+00  -2.546 0.011186 *   
as.factor(company)34   -1.135e+01  4.966e+00  -2.285 0.022759 *   
as.factor(company)35   -1.625e+00  4.975e+00  -0.327 0.744137     
as.factor(company)36   -1.550e+01  6.983e+00  -2.219 0.026912 *   
as.factor(company)37   -1.737e+01  5.040e+00  -3.447 0.000615 *** 
as.factor(company)38   -6.957e+00  5.008e+00  -1.389 0.165418     
as.factor(company)39   -1.054e+01  4.954e+00  -2.128 0.033794 *   
as.factor(company)41   -1.511e+01  4.868e+00  -3.105 0.002013 **  
as.factor(company)43   -1.529e+01  5.374e+00  -2.844 0.004634 **  
as.factor(company)44   -1.323e+01  5.229e+00  -2.531 0.011682 *   
as.factor(company)45   -8.056e+00  4.867e+00  -1.655 0.098525 .   
as.factor(company)46   -1.251e+01  6.911e+00  -1.810 0.070955 .   
as.factor(company)47   -1.186e+01  5.020e+00  -2.362 0.018560 *   
as.factor(company)48   -2.358e+00  4.963e+00  -0.475 0.634934     
as.factor(company)49   -1.308e+01  4.989e+00  -2.622 0.009006 **  
as.factor(company)50   -7.324e+00  5.183e+00  -1.413 0.158286     
as.factor(company)51   -6.555e+00  5.001e+00  -1.311 0.190519     
as.factor(company)52   -9.900e+00  4.037e+00  -2.452 0.014536 *   
as.factor(company)53   -1.481e+01  4.442e+00  -3.333 0.000923 *** 
as.factor(company)54   -1.508e+01  5.765e+00  -2.615 0.009192 **  
as.factor(company)55    7.144e+00  6.947e+00   1.028 0.304318     
as.factor(company)56   -6.163e+00  5.067e+00  -1.216 0.224419     
as.factor(company)57   -1.228e+01  6.970e+00  -1.762 0.078679 .   
as.factor(company)59   -1.396e+01  5.739e+00  -2.433 0.015341 *   
as.factor(company)60   -8.012e+00  5.037e+00  -1.591 0.112344     
as.factor(company)61   -1.114e+01  4.928e+00  -2.262 0.024159 *   
as.factor(company)62   -1.331e+01  4.867e+00  -2.735 0.006468 **  
as.factor(company)63   -1.253e+01  5.364e+00  -2.336 0.019901 *   
as.factor(company)64   -5.506e+00  5.096e+00  -1.080 0.280499     
as.factor(company)65   -1.595e+01  5.225e+00  -3.053 0.002391 **  
as.factor(company)66   -3.013e+00  5.143e+00  -0.586 0.558180     
as.factor(company)67   -1.120e+01  6.929e+00  -1.616 0.106813     
as.factor(company)68   -6.676e+00  4.973e+00  -1.342 0.180092     
as.factor(company)69   -1.150e+01  5.003e+00  -2.300 0.021883 *   
as.factor(company)70    1.267e+01  3.590e+00   3.529 0.000457 *** 
as.factor(company)71   -5.573e+00  6.097e+00  -0.914 0.361089     
as.factor(company)72   -5.281e+00  4.082e+00  -1.294 0.196301     
as.factor(company)73   -7.312e+00  6.188e+00  -1.182 0.237927     
as.factor(company)74   -1.209e+01  4.884e+00  -2.476 0.013616 *   
as.factor(company)75   -1.115e+01  3.802e+00  -2.932 0.003526 **  
as.factor(company)76    9.007e+00  5.141e+00   1.752 0.080397 .   
as.factor(company)77   -1.079e+01  4.567e+00  -2.362 0.018578 *   
as.factor(company)79    5.387e+00  3.786e+00   1.423 0.155444     
as.factor(company)80   -7.973e+00  5.149e+00  -1.548 0.122152     
as.factor(company)81   -1.290e+01  4.960e+00  -2.600 0.009602 **  
as.factor(company)82   -1.140e+01  4.853e+00  -2.350 0.019173 *   
as.factor(company)83   -1.410e+01  5.006e+00  -2.816 0.005051 **  
as.factor(company)84   -9.824e+00  5.015e+00  -1.959 0.050695 .   
as.factor(company)85    4.810e+00  4.936e+00   0.974 0.330365     
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as.factor(company)86   -1.240e+01  5.849e+00  -2.121 0.034440 *   
as.factor(company)87   -1.164e+01  4.956e+00  -2.349 0.019241 *   
as.factor(company)88   -1.221e+01  4.942e+00  -2.470 0.013847 *   
as.factor(company)90   -2.465e+00  4.965e+00  -0.496 0.619785     
as.factor(company)91   -1.379e+01  6.953e+00  -1.983 0.047906 *   
as.factor(company)92   -1.273e+01  4.904e+00  -2.597 0.009698 **  
as.factor(company)93   -2.864e+00  5.793e+00  -0.494 0.621173     
as.factor(company)94   -9.355e+00  4.983e+00  -1.878 0.061028 .   
as.factor(company)95   -1.877e+01  5.389e+00  -3.482 0.000541 *** 
as.factor(company)96   -1.214e+01  5.004e+00  -2.426 0.015613 *   
as.factor(company)97   -8.285e+00  6.977e+00  -1.187 0.235644     
as.factor(company)98   -8.053e+00  4.965e+00  -1.622 0.105415     
as.factor(company)99   -1.532e+01  3.593e+00  -4.264 2.41e-05 *** 
as.factor(company)100  -1.501e+01  4.645e+00  -3.231 0.001318 **  
as.factor(company)101  -1.584e+01  3.814e+00  -4.152 3.88e-05 *** 
as.factor(company)102  -1.507e+01  4.272e+00  -3.528 0.000458 *** 
as.factor(company)103  -1.246e+01  5.119e+00  -2.433 0.015315 *   
as.factor(company)104  -1.229e+01  5.686e+00  -2.162 0.031127 *   
as.factor(company)105  -1.312e+01  4.928e+00  -2.663 0.008005 **  
as.factor(company)106   4.159e+00  5.353e+00   0.777 0.437557     
as.factor(company)107  -1.104e+01  5.025e+00  -2.197 0.028521 *   
as.factor(company)109  -1.335e+01  5.334e+00  -2.502 0.012663 *   
as.factor(company)110  -1.193e+01  6.956e+00  -1.715 0.087000 .   
as.factor(company)111  -8.818e+00  4.853e+00  -1.817 0.069824 .   
as.factor(company)112  -1.531e+01  5.697e+00  -2.687 0.007459 **  
as.factor(company)113  -9.093e+00  4.954e+00  -1.835 0.067040 .   
as.factor(company)114   9.889e+00  4.977e+00   1.987 0.047472 *   
as.factor(company)115  -9.650e+00  6.922e+00  -1.394 0.163920     
as.factor(company)116  -1.563e+01  7.101e+00  -2.202 0.028140 *   
as.factor(company)117  -1.523e+01  4.080e+00  -3.733 0.000211 *** 
as.factor(company)118  -3.426e+01  6.860e+00  -4.995 8.17e-07 *** 
as.factor(company)119  -1.428e+01  5.801e+00  -2.461 0.014203 *   
as.factor(company)120  -1.706e+01  4.874e+00  -3.501 0.000505 *** 
as.factor(company)121  -1.439e+01  4.842e+00  -2.972 0.003102 **  
as.factor(company)122  -4.389e+00  4.857e+00  -0.904 0.366635     
as.factor(company)123  -1.641e+01  4.880e+00  -3.363 0.000831 *** 
as.factor(company)124  -1.547e+01  6.042e+00  -2.561 0.010740 *   
as.factor(company)125  -8.730e+00  1.096e+01  -0.797 0.426046     
as.factor(company)126  -1.344e+01  5.045e+00  -2.664 0.007972 **  
as.factor(company)127  -1.317e+01  7.050e+00  -1.868 0.062410 .   
as.factor(company)128  -7.478e+00  3.469e+00  -2.156 0.031587 *   
as.factor(company)129  -1.419e+01  4.040e+00  -3.513 0.000484 *** 
as.factor(company)130  -1.217e+01  1.089e+01  -1.118 0.264232     
as.factor(company)131  -1.423e+00  5.028e+00  -0.283 0.777272     
as.factor(company)132  -5.350e+00  4.852e+00  -1.103 0.270739     
as.factor(company)134  -5.152e+00  5.100e+00  -1.010 0.312869     
as.factor(company)136  -1.274e+01  5.328e+00  -2.391 0.017194 *   
as.factor(company)137   2.372e+02  4.959e+00  47.818  < 2e-16 *** 
as.factor(company)138  -1.044e+01  5.012e+00  -2.082 0.037817 *   
as.factor(company)139  -4.997e+00  3.566e+00  -1.401 0.161768     
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as.factor(company)140  -1.408e+01  5.070e+00  -2.777 0.005702 **  
as.factor(company)141   1.983e+00  5.791e+00   0.342 0.732202     
as.factor(company)143  -1.285e+01  4.976e+00  -2.582 0.010106 *   
as.factor(company)144  -7.706e+00  4.982e+00  -1.547 0.122560     
as.factor(company)145  -1.564e+01  6.966e+00  -2.245 0.025211 *   
as.factor(company)146  -1.418e+01  3.492e+00  -4.061 5.68e-05 *** 
as.factor(company)147  -1.071e+01  5.579e+00  -1.919 0.055568 .   
as.factor(company)153  -1.141e+01  4.880e+00  -2.339 0.019755 *   
as.factor(company)154  -9.726e+00  6.958e+00  -1.398 0.162799     
as.factor(company)155  -3.091e+00  4.867e+00  -0.635 0.525678     
as.factor(company)157  -6.632e+00  4.874e+00  -1.361 0.174242     
as.factor(company)158  -1.348e+01  4.967e+00  -2.714 0.006886 **  
as.factor(company)159  -8.542e+00  5.012e+00  -1.704 0.088924 .   
as.factor(company)160  -1.118e+01  5.891e+00  -1.899 0.058203 .   
as.factor(company)161  -6.215e+00  5.127e+00  -1.212 0.225979     
as.factor(company)162  -3.401e+00  4.870e+00  -0.698 0.485372     
as.factor(company)163  -7.252e+00  1.099e+01  -0.660 0.509488     
as.factor(company)164  -1.319e+01  4.825e+00  -2.734 0.006474 **  
as.factor(company)165  -1.687e+01  3.515e+00  -4.800 2.10e-06 *** 
as.factor(company)166  -7.525e+00  5.670e+00  -1.327 0.185062     
as.factor(company)167  -1.862e+00  3.643e+00  -0.511 0.609390     
as.factor(company)168  -1.157e+01  4.338e+00  -2.668 0.007887 **  
as.factor(company)169  -1.339e+01  5.146e+00  -2.602 0.009534 **  
as.factor(company)170  -8.360e+00  4.890e+00  -1.709 0.088008 .   
as.factor(company)171  -7.617e+00  4.944e+00  -1.541 0.124010     
as.factor(company)172  -8.689e+00  6.871e+00  -1.265 0.206597     
as.factor(company)173  -1.756e+01  4.880e+00  -3.597 0.000354 *** 
as.factor(company)174  -1.773e+01  6.836e+00  -2.594 0.009782 **  
as.factor(company)175  -1.581e+01  5.956e+00  -2.655 0.008180 **  
as.factor(company)176  -1.327e+01  4.815e+00  -2.756 0.006075 **  
as.factor(company)177  -1.674e+01  5.983e+00  -2.798 0.005335 **  
as.factor(company)178  -2.277e+01  4.898e+00  -4.649 4.28e-06 *** 
as.factor(company)179  -9.736e+00  5.371e+00  -1.813 0.070489 .   
as.factor(company)180  -4.479e+00  5.082e+00  -0.881 0.378531     
as.factor(company)181  -1.091e+01  4.806e+00  -2.270 0.023654 *   
as.factor(company)182  -1.736e+01  5.662e+00  -3.066 0.002292 **  
as.factor(company)183  -6.550e+00  5.107e+00  -1.283 0.200222     
as.factor(company)184  -1.682e+01  5.153e+00  -3.264 0.001177 **  
as.factor(company)185  -8.236e+00  5.012e+00  -1.643 0.100931     
as.factor(company)186  -9.871e+00  5.039e+00  -1.959 0.050667 .   
as.factor(company)187  -1.385e+01  6.846e+00  -2.023 0.043662 *   
as.factor(company)188  -1.081e+01  4.971e+00  -2.174 0.030180 *   
as.factor(company)189  -1.416e+01  4.843e+00  -2.925 0.003609 **  
as.factor(company)190  -1.054e+01  5.705e+00  -1.847 0.065299 .   
as.factor(company)191  -1.125e+01  5.402e+00  -2.082 0.037832 *   
as.factor(company)192  -1.476e+01  4.027e+00  -3.665 0.000275 *** 
as.factor(company)193  -1.161e+01  6.843e+00  -1.697 0.090339 .   
as.factor(company)194  -1.403e+01  4.855e+00  -2.890 0.004023 **  
as.factor(company)195  -1.646e+01  3.997e+00  -4.117 4.50e-05 *** 
as.factor(company)196  -6.596e+00  4.990e+00  -1.322 0.186825     
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as.factor(company)197  -1.446e+01  7.005e+00  -2.064 0.039586 *   
as.factor(company)199  -1.055e+01  4.994e+00  -2.113 0.035118 *   
as.numeric(nib)        -7.539e-01  4.430e-01  -1.702 0.089457 .   
as.numeric(nbmeeting)  -2.906e-02  1.386e-01  -0.210 0.833965     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 5.411 on 493 degrees of freedom 
  (64 observations deleted due to missingness) 
Multiple R-squared:  0.9583, Adjusted R-squared:  0.9425  
F-statistic: 60.55 on 187 and 493 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
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Appendix 3: ROA output with time effect 
 
The following output shows the results for ROA with taking time into consideration. 
 
summary(olswtt) 
 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = ROA ~ +as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) +  
    as.factor(industry) + as.numeric(leverage) + as.numeric(nbcom) +  
    as.numeric(employees) + as.factor(company) + as.factor(Year) +  
    as.numeric(nib) + as.numeric(nbmeeting), data = mydata) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-26.037  -1.446   0.016   1.491  40.454  
 
Coefficients: 
                         Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)             2.482e+01  1.139e+01   2.180 0.029765 *   
as.numeric(Audit)      -2.239e+00  8.377e+00  -0.267 0.789384     
as.numeric(board_size)  3.577e-01  3.960e-01   0.903 0.366815     
as.factor(industry)1   -1.162e+00  3.353e+00  -0.346 0.729142     
as.numeric(leverage)    2.637e-04  1.663e-03   0.159 0.874051     
as.numeric(nbcom)      -9.320e-01  7.793e-01  -1.196 0.232280     
as.numeric(employees)  -1.521e-03  2.147e-03  -0.709 0.478887     
as.factor(company)2     1.397e+00  6.026e+00   0.232 0.816783     
as.factor(company)3    -6.404e+00  3.539e+00  -1.810 0.070961 .   
as.factor(company)4    -7.697e+00  5.035e+00  -1.529 0.126988     
as.factor(company)5    -5.880e+00  3.739e+00  -1.573 0.116418     
as.factor(company)6    -1.103e+01  5.207e+00  -2.118 0.034666 *   
as.factor(company)8    -1.677e+01  4.959e+00  -3.382 0.000778 *** 
as.factor(company)9    -1.229e+01  5.019e+00  -2.449 0.014694 *   
as.factor(company)10    1.114e+00  5.344e+00   0.209 0.834888     
as.factor(company)11    4.800e+00  4.747e+00   1.011 0.312382     
as.factor(company)12   -9.141e+00  4.951e+00  -1.846 0.065438 .   
as.factor(company)13   -1.159e+01  4.977e+00  -2.328 0.020324 *   
as.factor(company)14   -1.107e+01  4.921e+00  -2.250 0.024916 *   
as.factor(company)15    1.961e+01  5.841e+00   3.358 0.000847 *** 
as.factor(company)16   -1.374e+01  3.591e+00  -3.827 0.000147 *** 
as.factor(company)17   -1.025e+01  6.963e+00  -1.472 0.141564     
as.factor(company)18   -1.230e+01  5.117e+00  -2.404 0.016593 *   
as.factor(company)19   -1.252e+01  4.905e+00  -2.552 0.011021 *   
as.factor(company)20   -1.360e+01  3.711e+00  -3.665 0.000274 *** 
as.factor(company)21   -1.052e+01  4.871e+00  -2.160 0.031275 *   
as.factor(company)22   -1.446e+01  6.965e+00  -2.076 0.038445 *   
as.factor(company)23   -3.641e+00  5.338e+00  -0.682 0.495595     
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as.factor(company)24   -6.538e+00  5.082e+00  -1.287 0.198869     
as.factor(company)26   -9.744e+00  5.084e+00  -1.917 0.055845 .   
as.factor(company)27   -9.290e+00  5.421e+00  -1.714 0.087237 .   
as.factor(company)28   -1.100e+01  5.337e+00  -2.061 0.039789 *   
as.factor(company)29    4.558e+00  4.951e+00   0.921 0.357708     
as.factor(company)30   -9.162e+00  5.030e+00  -1.821 0.069147 .   
as.factor(company)32   -5.323e+00  5.007e+00  -1.063 0.288208     
as.factor(company)33   -1.494e+01  5.781e+00  -2.583 0.010070 *   
as.factor(company)34   -1.143e+01  4.964e+00  -2.303 0.021710 *   
as.factor(company)35   -1.555e+00  4.976e+00  -0.312 0.754822     
as.factor(company)36   -1.525e+01  6.988e+00  -2.182 0.029582 *   
as.factor(company)37   -1.714e+01  5.051e+00  -3.393 0.000748 *** 
as.factor(company)38   -6.816e+00  5.006e+00  -1.362 0.173981     
as.factor(company)39   -1.031e+01  4.959e+00  -2.079 0.038165 *   
as.factor(company)41   -1.499e+01  4.868e+00  -3.079 0.002191 **  
as.factor(company)43   -1.552e+01  5.375e+00  -2.887 0.004067 **  
as.factor(company)44   -1.309e+01  5.243e+00  -2.496 0.012902 *   
as.factor(company)45   -7.927e+00  4.868e+00  -1.628 0.104079     
as.factor(company)46   -1.276e+01  6.931e+00  -1.841 0.066166 .   
as.factor(company)47   -1.151e+01  5.023e+00  -2.292 0.022341 *   
as.factor(company)48   -2.258e+00  4.962e+00  -0.455 0.649298     
as.factor(company)49   -1.284e+01  4.989e+00  -2.573 0.010369 *   
as.factor(company)50   -7.308e+00  5.194e+00  -1.407 0.160023     
as.factor(company)51   -6.520e+00  5.003e+00  -1.303 0.193050     
as.factor(company)52   -9.796e+00  4.040e+00  -2.425 0.015690 *   
as.factor(company)53   -1.440e+01  4.478e+00  -3.216 0.001388 **  
as.factor(company)54   -1.539e+01  5.769e+00  -2.668 0.007875 **  
as.factor(company)55    7.443e+00  6.953e+00   1.070 0.284952     
as.factor(company)56   -5.964e+00  5.069e+00  -1.177 0.239916     
as.factor(company)57   -1.202e+01  6.968e+00  -1.725 0.085216 .   
as.factor(company)59   -1.383e+01  5.744e+00  -2.407 0.016438 *   
as.factor(company)60   -8.094e+00  5.040e+00  -1.606 0.108926     
as.factor(company)61   -1.109e+01  4.933e+00  -2.247 0.025088 *   
as.factor(company)62   -1.315e+01  4.868e+00  -2.701 0.007155 **  
as.factor(company)63   -1.228e+01  5.373e+00  -2.285 0.022723 *   
as.factor(company)64   -5.238e+00  5.105e+00  -1.026 0.305409     
as.factor(company)65   -1.594e+01  5.221e+00  -3.052 0.002393 **  
as.factor(company)66   -2.667e+00  5.142e+00  -0.519 0.604282     
as.factor(company)67   -1.056e+01  6.938e+00  -1.523 0.128529     
as.factor(company)68   -6.555e+00  4.974e+00  -1.318 0.188135     
as.factor(company)69   -1.127e+01  5.007e+00  -2.251 0.024842 *   
as.factor(company)70    1.268e+01  3.587e+00   3.534 0.000447 *** 
as.factor(company)71   -5.959e+00  6.097e+00  -0.977 0.328832     
as.factor(company)72   -5.430e+00  4.088e+00  -1.328 0.184768     
as.factor(company)73   -7.883e+00  6.192e+00  -1.273 0.203598     
as.factor(company)74   -1.185e+01  4.883e+00  -2.426 0.015625 *   
as.factor(company)75   -1.127e+01  3.809e+00  -2.960 0.003226 **  
as.factor(company)76    9.048e+00  5.138e+00   1.761 0.078886 .   
as.factor(company)77   -1.051e+01  4.581e+00  -2.293 0.022248 *   
as.factor(company)79    5.255e+00  3.784e+00   1.389 0.165496     
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as.factor(company)80   -7.868e+00  5.148e+00  -1.528 0.127107     
as.factor(company)81   -1.287e+01  4.961e+00  -2.595 0.009730 **  
as.factor(company)82   -1.154e+01  4.861e+00  -2.374 0.017959 *   
as.factor(company)83   -1.388e+01  5.004e+00  -2.773 0.005762 **  
as.factor(company)84   -9.942e+00  5.020e+00  -1.980 0.048212 *   
as.factor(company)85    5.011e+00  4.937e+00   1.015 0.310549     
as.factor(company)86   -1.236e+01  5.857e+00  -2.110 0.035363 *   
as.factor(company)87   -1.155e+01  4.955e+00  -2.331 0.020165 *   
as.factor(company)88   -1.219e+01  4.946e+00  -2.465 0.014037 *   
as.factor(company)90   -2.326e+00  4.962e+00  -0.469 0.639531     
as.factor(company)91   -1.399e+01  6.966e+00  -2.008 0.045196 *   
as.factor(company)92   -1.264e+01  4.909e+00  -2.575 0.010325 *   
as.factor(company)93   -2.810e+00  5.795e+00  -0.485 0.627961     
as.factor(company)94   -9.264e+00  4.983e+00  -1.859 0.063630 .   
as.factor(company)95   -1.881e+01  5.393e+00  -3.488 0.000530 *** 
as.factor(company)96   -1.185e+01  5.004e+00  -2.368 0.018288 *   
as.factor(company)97   -8.103e+00  6.998e+00  -1.158 0.247486     
as.factor(company)98   -7.973e+00  4.963e+00  -1.606 0.108824     
as.factor(company)99   -1.495e+01  3.597e+00  -4.155 3.84e-05 *** 
as.factor(company)100  -1.492e+01  4.643e+00  -3.213 0.001401 **  
as.factor(company)101  -1.559e+01  3.818e+00  -4.084 5.16e-05 *** 
as.factor(company)102  -1.491e+01  4.276e+00  -3.486 0.000534 *** 
as.factor(company)103  -1.203e+01  5.130e+00  -2.346 0.019371 *   
as.factor(company)104  -1.202e+01  5.694e+00  -2.111 0.035265 *   
as.factor(company)105  -1.321e+01  4.927e+00  -2.682 0.007569 **  
as.factor(company)106   3.945e+00  5.353e+00   0.737 0.461515     
as.factor(company)107  -1.108e+01  5.028e+00  -2.204 0.028021 *   
as.factor(company)109  -1.311e+01  5.340e+00  -2.455 0.014416 *   
as.factor(company)110  -1.192e+01  6.971e+00  -1.711 0.087792 .   
as.factor(company)111  -8.791e+00  4.852e+00  -1.812 0.070657 .   
as.factor(company)112  -1.562e+01  5.707e+00  -2.737 0.006429 **  
as.factor(company)113  -8.995e+00  4.955e+00  -1.815 0.070061 .   
as.factor(company)114   9.969e+00  4.979e+00   2.002 0.045809 *   
as.factor(company)115  -1.017e+01  6.947e+00  -1.464 0.143952     
as.factor(company)116  -1.578e+01  7.128e+00  -2.214 0.027294 *   
as.factor(company)117  -1.504e+01  4.077e+00  -3.690 0.000250 *** 
as.factor(company)118  -3.422e+01  6.869e+00  -4.982 8.76e-07 *** 
as.factor(company)119  -1.379e+01  5.816e+00  -2.371 0.018117 *   
as.factor(company)120  -1.701e+01  4.875e+00  -3.489 0.000529 *** 
as.factor(company)121  -1.434e+01  4.840e+00  -2.962 0.003203 **  
as.factor(company)122  -4.451e+00  4.856e+00  -0.916 0.359870     
as.factor(company)123  -1.652e+01  4.879e+00  -3.386 0.000766 *** 
as.factor(company)124  -1.591e+01  6.052e+00  -2.629 0.008835 **  
as.factor(company)125  -9.643e+00  1.096e+01  -0.880 0.379486     
as.factor(company)126  -1.342e+01  5.050e+00  -2.658 0.008115 **  
as.factor(company)127  -1.254e+01  7.056e+00  -1.778 0.076023 .   
as.factor(company)128  -7.398e+00  3.469e+00  -2.133 0.033444 *   
as.factor(company)129  -1.387e+01  4.076e+00  -3.403 0.000721 *** 
as.factor(company)130  -1.334e+01  1.091e+01  -1.223 0.221855     
as.factor(company)131  -1.289e+00  5.032e+00  -0.256 0.797987     
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as.factor(company)132  -5.393e+00  4.855e+00  -1.111 0.267148     
as.factor(company)134  -5.147e+00  5.099e+00  -1.009 0.313245     
as.factor(company)136  -1.280e+01  5.325e+00  -2.404 0.016602 *   
as.factor(company)137   2.372e+02  4.957e+00  47.841  < 2e-16 *** 
as.factor(company)138  -1.014e+01  5.013e+00  -2.022 0.043697 *   
as.factor(company)139  -4.901e+00  3.575e+00  -1.371 0.171074     
as.factor(company)140  -1.378e+01  5.071e+00  -2.718 0.006798 **  
as.factor(company)141   1.780e+00  5.791e+00   0.307 0.758765     
as.factor(company)143  -1.253e+01  4.977e+00  -2.518 0.012107 *   
as.factor(company)144  -7.860e+00  4.982e+00  -1.578 0.115249     
as.factor(company)145  -1.607e+01  6.983e+00  -2.301 0.021822 *   
as.factor(company)146  -1.418e+01  3.490e+00  -4.063 5.65e-05 *** 
as.factor(company)147  -1.022e+01  5.596e+00  -1.826 0.068453 .   
as.factor(company)153  -1.118e+01  4.880e+00  -2.290 0.022441 *   
as.factor(company)154  -1.012e+01  6.984e+00  -1.449 0.148035     
as.factor(company)155  -2.985e+00  4.869e+00  -0.613 0.540167     
as.factor(company)157  -6.703e+00  4.876e+00  -1.375 0.169825     
as.factor(company)158  -1.354e+01  4.965e+00  -2.728 0.006598 **  
as.factor(company)159  -8.448e+00  5.010e+00  -1.686 0.092369 .   
as.factor(company)160  -1.086e+01  5.908e+00  -1.839 0.066522 .   
as.factor(company)161  -6.217e+00  5.122e+00  -1.214 0.225433     
as.factor(company)162  -3.310e+00  4.871e+00  -0.679 0.497176     
as.factor(company)163  -8.647e+00  1.100e+01  -0.786 0.432289     
as.factor(company)164  -1.330e+01  4.828e+00  -2.755 0.006092 **  
as.factor(company)165  -1.688e+01  3.516e+00  -4.801 2.10e-06 *** 
as.factor(company)166  -7.689e+00  5.680e+00  -1.354 0.176429     
as.factor(company)167  -1.999e+00  3.640e+00  -0.549 0.583208     
as.factor(company)168  -1.109e+01  4.339e+00  -2.556 0.010901 *   
as.factor(company)169  -1.329e+01  5.145e+00  -2.583 0.010097 *   
as.factor(company)170  -8.216e+00  4.893e+00  -1.679 0.093726 .   
as.factor(company)171  -7.557e+00  4.942e+00  -1.529 0.126875     
as.factor(company)172  -8.294e+00  6.888e+00  -1.204 0.229138     
as.factor(company)173  -1.742e+01  4.881e+00  -3.569 0.000394 *** 
as.factor(company)174  -1.841e+01  6.850e+00  -2.688 0.007437 **  
as.factor(company)175  -1.611e+01  5.966e+00  -2.701 0.007153 **  
as.factor(company)176  -1.332e+01  4.813e+00  -2.768 0.005851 **  
as.factor(company)177  -1.661e+01  5.985e+00  -2.776 0.005718 **  
as.factor(company)178  -2.285e+01  4.899e+00  -4.664 4.01e-06 *** 
as.factor(company)179  -9.514e+00  5.371e+00  -1.771 0.077128 .   
as.factor(company)180  -4.382e+00  5.090e+00  -0.861 0.389680     
as.factor(company)181  -1.086e+01  4.805e+00  -2.260 0.024290 *   
as.factor(company)182  -1.762e+01  5.675e+00  -3.106 0.002008 **  
as.factor(company)183  -6.383e+00  5.109e+00  -1.249 0.212093     
as.factor(company)184  -1.687e+01  5.151e+00  -3.274 0.001134 **  
as.factor(company)185  -8.019e+00  5.016e+00  -1.599 0.110544     
as.factor(company)186  -9.861e+00  5.042e+00  -1.956 0.051050 .   
as.factor(company)187  -1.443e+01  6.856e+00  -2.105 0.035838 *   
as.factor(company)188  -1.072e+01  4.971e+00  -2.156 0.031554 *   
as.factor(company)189  -1.414e+01  4.842e+00  -2.920 0.003664 **  
as.factor(company)190  -1.035e+01  5.721e+00  -1.808 0.071168 .   
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as.factor(company)191  -1.110e+01  5.411e+00  -2.052 0.040661 *   
as.factor(company)192  -1.433e+01  4.041e+00  -3.545 0.000430 *** 
as.factor(company)193  -1.080e+01  6.855e+00  -1.575 0.115935     
as.factor(company)194  -1.406e+01  4.855e+00  -2.896 0.003943 **  
as.factor(company)195  -1.639e+01  4.006e+00  -4.090 5.03e-05 *** 
as.factor(company)196  -6.514e+00  4.991e+00  -1.305 0.192467     
as.factor(company)197  -1.400e+01  7.012e+00  -1.997 0.046354 *   
as.factor(company)199  -1.063e+01  4.992e+00  -2.130 0.033639 *   
as.factor(Year)2014     8.541e-01  7.088e-01   1.205 0.228739     
as.factor(Year)2015     1.160e-01  7.318e-01   0.159 0.874109     
as.factor(Year)2016    -5.498e-01  7.545e-01  -0.729 0.466545     
as.factor(Year)2017     6.033e-01  7.357e-01   0.820 0.412612     
as.numeric(nib)        -7.405e-01  4.603e-01  -1.609 0.108305     
as.numeric(nbmeeting)  -4.768e-02  1.493e-01  -0.319 0.749554     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 5.404 on 489 degrees of freedom 
  (64 observations deleted due to missingness) 
Multiple R-squared:  0.9587, Adjusted R-squared:  0.9426  
F-statistic: 59.45 on 191 and 489 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
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Appendix 4: ROA OLS output 
 
The following output (using ordinary least square method) ignored both time and 
companies’ effect with ROA. 
ols2 <-
lm(ROA~+as.numeric(Audit)+(as.numeric(board_size))+as.factor(industry)+as.nume
ric(leverage)+as.numeric(nbcom)+as.numeric(employees)+as.numeric(nib)+as.numer
ic(nbmeeting), data=mydata) 
summary(ols2) 
 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = ROA ~ +as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) +  
    as.factor(industry) + as.numeric(leverage) + as.numeric(nbcom) +  
    as.numeric(employees) + as.numeric(nib) + as.numeric(nbmeeting),  
    data = mydata) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-31.210  -6.698  -1.598   2.762 249.072  
 
Coefficients: 
                        Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)            32.100123   8.191576   3.919 9.82e-05 *** 
as.numeric(Audit)       4.818390   6.740731   0.715  0.47497     
as.numeric(board_size) -0.975516   0.698982  -1.396  0.16329     
as.factor(industry)1   -1.539586   2.409255  -0.639  0.52302     
as.numeric(leverage)   -0.020816   0.004174  -4.987 7.83e-07 *** 
as.numeric(nbcom)      -3.584221   1.168632  -3.067  0.00225 **  
as.numeric(employees)   0.005759   0.004067   1.416  0.15719     
as.numeric(nib)         0.301754   0.804261   0.375  0.70763     
as.numeric(nbmeeting)  -0.080419   0.350926  -0.229  0.81881     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 21.89 on 672 degrees of freedom 
  (64 observations deleted due to missingness) 
Multiple R-squared:  0.06918, Adjusted R-squared:  0.05809  
F-statistic: 6.243 on 8 and 672 DF,  p-value: 8.337e-08 
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Appendix 5: ROA fixed model 
 
This is the fixed model that takes companies’ effect as factors. 
Oneway (individual) effect Between Model 
 
Call: 
plm(formula = ROA ~ as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) +  
    as.factor(industry) + as.numeric(leverage) + as.numeric(nbcom) +  
    as.numeric(employees) + as.numeric(nib) + as.numeric(nbmeeting),  
    data = mydata, model = "between", index = c("company")) 
 
Unbalanced Panel: n = 180, T = 1-5, N = 681 
Observations used in estimation: 180 
 
Residuals: 
     Min.   1st Qu.    Median   3rd Qu.      Max.  
-30.32926  -5.40913  -0.75183   3.17023 234.92089  
 
Coefficients: 
                         Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)            34.7302771 14.0002955  2.4807 0.014080 *  
as.numeric(Audit)       3.0091357 10.9208493  0.2755 0.783234    
as.numeric(board_size) -1.1867578  1.2963523 -0.9155 0.361240    
as.factor(industry)1   -1.8909339  4.0937127 -0.4619 0.644732    
as.numeric(leverage)   -0.0261351  0.0083903 -3.1149 0.002158 ** 
as.numeric(nbcom)      -3.4809019  2.2503888 -1.5468 0.123760    
as.numeric(employees)   0.0082303  0.0075488  1.0903 0.277126    
as.numeric(nib)         0.7199976  1.5532249  0.4636 0.643560    
as.numeric(nbmeeting)  -0.2955304  0.7341947 -0.4025 0.687802    
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Total Sum of Squares:    68979 
Residual Sum of Squares: 62810 
R-Squared:      0.089422 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.046822 
F-statistic: 2.09911 on 8 and 171 DF, p-value: 0.038333 
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Appendix 6: ROA f-test 
 
This is F test to show which model is better (fixed model or ordinary least square 
method). 
pFtest(fixed,ols2) 
F test for individual effects 
 
data:  ROA ~ as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) + as.factor(industry) +  ... 
F = 1.4085, df1 = 501, df2 = 171, p-value = 0.004235 
alternative hypothesis: significant effects 
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Appendix 7: Tobin’s Q output without time effect 
 
The following output shows the results for Tobin’s Q ignoring time effect. 
 
olswt <-
lm(TobinQ~+as.numeric(Audit)+(as.numeric(board_size))+as.factor(industry)+as.nu
meric(leverage)+as.numeric(nbcom)+as.numeric(employees)+as.factor(company)+as.
numeric(nib)+as.numeric(nbmeeting), data=mydata) 
summary(olswt) 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = TobinQ ~ +as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) +  
    as.factor(industry) + as.numeric(leverage) + as.numeric(nbcom) +  
    as.numeric(employees) + as.factor(company) + as.numeric(nib) +  
    as.numeric(nbmeeting), data = mydata) 
 
Residuals: 
       Min         1Q     Median         3Q        Max  
-0.0070847 -0.0000885  0.0000000  0.0000992  0.0093031  
 
Coefficients: 
                         Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)             1.133e-03  1.380e-03   0.821 0.411840     
as.numeric(Audit)      -9.780e-05  1.030e-03  -0.095 0.924423     
as.numeric(board_size)  4.462e-05  4.605e-05   0.969 0.333119     
as.factor(industry)1    3.614e-05  4.096e-04   0.088 0.929719     
as.numeric(leverage)   -1.906e-07  2.030e-07  -0.939 0.348179     
as.numeric(nbcom)      -6.453e-05  8.954e-05  -0.721 0.471447     
as.numeric(employees)   1.937e-07  2.493e-07   0.777 0.437513     
as.factor(company)2     8.876e-05  7.423e-04   0.120 0.904868     
as.factor(company)3     3.132e-04  4.361e-04   0.718 0.472925     
as.factor(company)4     9.316e-04  6.185e-04   1.506 0.132591     
as.factor(company)5    -1.301e-04  4.597e-04  -0.283 0.777237     
as.factor(company)6    -1.698e-05  6.401e-04  -0.027 0.978842     
as.factor(company)7    -6.207e-04  5.700e-04  -1.089 0.276742     
as.factor(company)8    -4.341e-04  6.080e-04  -0.714 0.475529     
as.factor(company)9    -2.789e-06  5.985e-04  -0.005 0.996283     
as.factor(company)10    6.563e-03  6.555e-04  10.013  < 2e-16 *** 
as.factor(company)11    2.284e-03  5.828e-04   3.919 0.000101 *** 
as.factor(company)12    2.523e-04  6.073e-04   0.415 0.678006     
as.factor(company)13    1.051e-03  6.091e-04   1.725 0.085168 .   
as.factor(company)14    3.398e-04  6.035e-04   0.563 0.573679     
as.factor(company)15    8.905e-03  7.156e-04  12.444  < 2e-16 *** 
as.factor(company)16   -7.267e-04  4.417e-04  -1.645 0.100535     
as.factor(company)17    7.699e-04  8.542e-04   0.901 0.367795     
as.factor(company)18    1.092e-04  6.237e-04   0.175 0.861097     
59 
 
as.factor(company)19   -1.880e-04  6.011e-04  -0.313 0.754618     
as.factor(company)20   -7.157e-04  4.555e-04  -1.571 0.116708     
as.factor(company)21   -2.008e-04  5.977e-04  -0.336 0.736998     
as.factor(company)22    1.376e-04  8.552e-04   0.161 0.872227     
as.factor(company)23    1.302e-04  6.547e-04   0.199 0.842410     
as.factor(company)24    4.581e-05  6.223e-04   0.074 0.941348     
as.factor(company)25   -3.095e-04  8.740e-04  -0.354 0.723414     
as.factor(company)26   -2.868e-04  6.219e-04  -0.461 0.644901     
as.factor(company)27    1.179e-03  6.145e-04   1.918 0.055606 .   
as.factor(company)28   -2.635e-04  6.473e-04  -0.407 0.684116     
as.factor(company)29    9.886e-04  6.073e-04   1.628 0.104165     
as.factor(company)30   -4.343e-04  6.159e-04  -0.705 0.480995     
as.factor(company)32    3.404e-04  6.110e-04   0.557 0.577654     
as.factor(company)33    1.286e-03  7.101e-04   1.812 0.070624 .   
as.factor(company)34    4.997e-04  6.078e-04   0.822 0.411358     
as.factor(company)35    2.581e-03  6.099e-04   4.232 2.74e-05 *** 
as.factor(company)36   -5.363e-04  8.588e-04  -0.624 0.532596     
as.factor(company)37   -3.575e-05  6.175e-04  -0.058 0.953852     
as.factor(company)38   -1.792e-04  5.985e-04  -0.299 0.764738     
as.factor(company)39   -6.494e-04  6.082e-04  -1.068 0.286179     
as.factor(company)40   -7.551e-04  7.364e-04  -1.025 0.305660     
as.factor(company)41   -2.760e-04  5.971e-04  -0.462 0.644079     
as.factor(company)42   -7.275e-04  7.381e-04  -0.986 0.324722     
as.factor(company)43    1.631e-04  6.579e-04   0.248 0.804307     
as.factor(company)44    2.575e-05  6.413e-04   0.040 0.967987     
as.factor(company)45    9.329e-04  5.976e-04   1.561 0.119112     
as.factor(company)46    5.595e-04  8.508e-04   0.658 0.511093     
as.factor(company)47   -2.886e-04  6.140e-04  -0.470 0.638511     
as.factor(company)48    2.155e-03  6.080e-04   3.544 0.000430 *** 
as.factor(company)49   -3.053e-04  6.110e-04  -0.500 0.617508     
as.factor(company)50   -3.541e-04  6.358e-04  -0.557 0.577805     
as.factor(company)51    1.014e-03  6.127e-04   1.655 0.098589 .   
as.factor(company)52   -2.594e-04  4.641e-04  -0.559 0.576552     
as.factor(company)53   -4.205e-04  5.447e-04  -0.772 0.440433     
as.factor(company)54    8.579e-05  7.075e-04   0.121 0.903533     
as.factor(company)55    3.888e-03  8.546e-04   4.550 6.68e-06 *** 
as.factor(company)56    2.922e-04  6.206e-04   0.471 0.637911     
as.factor(company)57    8.364e-04  8.575e-04   0.975 0.329807     
as.factor(company)59   -5.064e-04  7.046e-04  -0.719 0.472661     
as.factor(company)60    1.312e-03  6.169e-04   2.126 0.033949 *   
as.factor(company)61   -8.372e-04  6.051e-04  -1.384 0.167096     
as.factor(company)62   -6.587e-05  5.969e-04  -0.110 0.912180     
as.factor(company)63   -2.311e-04  6.114e-04  -0.378 0.705626     
as.factor(company)64    7.315e-04  6.245e-04   1.171 0.242019     
as.factor(company)65   -4.249e-04  6.418e-04  -0.662 0.508260     
as.factor(company)66   -2.704e-04  6.304e-04  -0.429 0.668138     
as.factor(company)67   -4.523e-04  8.519e-04  -0.531 0.595711     
as.factor(company)68    1.681e-03  6.098e-04   2.757 0.006036 **  
as.factor(company)69   -4.828e-04  6.128e-04  -0.788 0.431127     
as.factor(company)70    7.740e-03  4.419e-04  17.515  < 2e-16 *** 
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as.factor(company)71    1.272e-03  7.512e-04   1.693 0.091052 .   
as.factor(company)73    2.109e-04  7.610e-04   0.277 0.781777     
as.factor(company)74    1.008e-03  5.994e-04   1.682 0.093164 .   
as.factor(company)75   -3.638e-04  4.684e-04  -0.777 0.437674     
as.factor(company)76    2.965e-03  6.305e-04   4.704 3.28e-06 *** 
as.factor(company)77   -6.153e-04  5.370e-04  -1.146 0.252462     
as.factor(company)78   -7.177e-04  4.579e-04  -1.567 0.117636     
as.factor(company)79    2.534e-03  4.655e-04   5.443 8.11e-08 *** 
as.factor(company)80    1.410e-03  6.118e-04   2.305 0.021558 *   
as.factor(company)81    1.163e-05  6.081e-04   0.019 0.984753     
as.factor(company)82   -1.824e-05  5.960e-04  -0.031 0.975598     
as.factor(company)83    1.804e-04  6.134e-04   0.294 0.768876     
as.factor(company)84    3.444e-04  6.142e-04   0.561 0.575282     
as.factor(company)85    2.376e-03  6.053e-04   3.925 9.83e-05 *** 
as.factor(company)86   -6.222e-04  7.174e-04  -0.867 0.386245     
as.factor(company)87    1.610e-03  6.075e-04   2.650 0.008301 **  
as.factor(company)88   -4.719e-04  6.066e-04  -0.778 0.436972     
as.factor(company)89    5.445e-04  8.460e-04   0.644 0.520089     
as.factor(company)90    1.760e-03  6.078e-04   2.895 0.003945 **  
as.factor(company)91   -1.130e-04  8.554e-04  -0.132 0.894974     
as.factor(company)92   -2.501e-04  6.036e-04  -0.414 0.678762     
as.factor(company)93    1.919e-03  7.103e-04   2.702 0.007115 **  
as.factor(company)94    5.046e-04  6.107e-04   0.826 0.409038     
as.factor(company)95    1.890e-03  6.603e-04   2.862 0.004373 **  
as.factor(company)96   -1.904e-04  6.127e-04  -0.311 0.756127     
as.factor(company)97    7.836e-04  8.575e-04   0.914 0.361242     
as.factor(company)98   -3.162e-04  6.083e-04  -0.520 0.603409     
as.factor(company)99   -9.118e-04  4.416e-04  -2.064 0.039467 *   
as.factor(company)100  -8.677e-04  4.458e-04  -1.947 0.052128 .   
as.factor(company)101  -8.862e-04  4.452e-04  -1.991 0.047053 *   
as.factor(company)102   4.064e-04  5.233e-04   0.777 0.437776     
as.factor(company)103  -1.758e-04  6.266e-04  -0.281 0.779113     
as.factor(company)104  -6.239e-04  6.989e-04  -0.893 0.372425     
as.factor(company)105  -3.015e-05  6.039e-04  -0.050 0.960193     
as.factor(company)106   1.017e-05  6.568e-04   0.015 0.987658     
as.factor(company)107   5.486e-04  6.171e-04   0.889 0.374397     
as.factor(company)108  -6.715e-04  7.378e-04  -0.910 0.363186     
as.factor(company)109   1.408e-04  6.539e-04   0.215 0.829592     
as.factor(company)110  -4.352e-04  8.549e-04  -0.509 0.610898     
as.factor(company)111  -3.742e-05  5.960e-04  -0.063 0.949969     
as.factor(company)112  -2.337e-04  7.000e-04  -0.334 0.738637     
as.factor(company)113  -2.958e-04  6.060e-04  -0.488 0.625655     
as.factor(company)114   2.999e-03  6.094e-04   4.922 1.15e-06 *** 
as.factor(company)115  -6.610e-04  8.522e-04  -0.776 0.438289     
as.factor(company)116   5.588e-03  8.711e-04   6.414 3.18e-10 *** 
as.factor(company)117  -8.903e-04  4.437e-04  -2.006 0.045338 *   
as.factor(company)118   8.159e-04  8.442e-04   0.966 0.334281     
as.factor(company)119   4.648e-04  7.106e-04   0.654 0.513374     
as.factor(company)120  -5.997e-05  5.984e-04  -0.100 0.920219     
as.factor(company)121  -3.636e-04  5.942e-04  -0.612 0.540898     
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as.factor(company)122   2.883e-04  5.967e-04   0.483 0.629175     
as.factor(company)123  -2.131e-04  5.988e-04  -0.356 0.722027     
as.factor(company)124  -7.301e-04  7.450e-04  -0.980 0.327547     
as.factor(company)125   6.173e-05  1.348e-03   0.046 0.963482     
as.factor(company)126  -9.923e-04  6.194e-04  -1.602 0.109727     
as.factor(company)127  -4.064e-04  8.669e-04  -0.469 0.639361     
as.factor(company)128   4.594e-04  4.277e-04   1.074 0.283299     
as.factor(company)129  -7.008e-04  4.941e-04  -1.418 0.156679     
as.factor(company)130   9.116e-04  1.330e-03   0.685 0.493370     
as.factor(company)131   1.334e-03  6.166e-04   2.164 0.030895 *   
as.factor(company)132   2.148e-04  5.959e-04   0.360 0.718688     
as.factor(company)134   3.344e-04  6.247e-04   0.535 0.592593     
as.factor(company)135  -9.200e-04  5.902e-04  -1.559 0.119667     
as.factor(company)136  -1.222e-04  6.534e-04  -0.187 0.851719     
as.factor(company)137   6.111e-02  6.077e-04 100.564  < 2e-16 *** 
as.factor(company)138  -1.351e-04  6.140e-04  -0.220 0.825993     
as.factor(company)139  -9.230e-05  4.389e-04  -0.210 0.833523     
as.factor(company)140  -1.348e-04  6.186e-04  -0.218 0.827617     
as.factor(company)141   3.612e-03  7.108e-04   5.082 5.23e-07 *** 
as.factor(company)142  -7.588e-04  4.483e-04  -1.693 0.091136 .   
as.factor(company)143  -6.810e-04  6.100e-04  -1.116 0.264752     
as.factor(company)144  -1.553e-04  6.115e-04  -0.254 0.799625     
as.factor(company)145  -8.732e-05  8.563e-04  -0.102 0.918823     
as.factor(company)146  -5.322e-04  4.305e-04  -1.236 0.216977     
as.factor(company)147   1.838e-03  6.832e-04   2.690 0.007381 **  
as.factor(company)153  -3.508e-04  5.989e-04  -0.586 0.558283     
as.factor(company)154  -2.835e-04  7.137e-04  -0.397 0.691375     
as.factor(company)155   1.034e-03  5.978e-04   1.730 0.084201 .   
as.factor(company)156   1.619e-03  6.582e-04   2.460 0.014214 *   
as.factor(company)157   1.074e-03  5.981e-04   1.796 0.073030 .   
as.factor(company)158   4.630e-05  6.079e-04   0.076 0.939319     
as.factor(company)159   4.300e-04  6.128e-04   0.702 0.483169     
as.factor(company)160  -4.925e-04  7.233e-04  -0.681 0.496265     
as.factor(company)161   8.853e-04  6.283e-04   1.409 0.159391     
as.factor(company)162   1.971e-03  5.981e-04   3.296 0.001049 **  
as.factor(company)163   1.339e-03  1.351e-03   0.992 0.321891     
as.factor(company)164  -1.786e-04  5.927e-04  -0.301 0.763342     
as.factor(company)165  -8.980e-04  4.337e-04  -2.071 0.038877 *   
as.factor(company)166   1.816e-04  6.975e-04   0.260 0.794722     
as.factor(company)167   1.090e-05  4.482e-04   0.024 0.980612     
as.factor(company)168  -7.488e-04  5.244e-04  -1.428 0.153896     
as.factor(company)169   1.113e-03  6.307e-04   1.766 0.078052 .   
as.factor(company)170   3.949e-04  6.007e-04   0.657 0.511188     
as.factor(company)171   6.654e-05  6.058e-04   0.110 0.912583     
as.factor(company)172   1.084e-03  8.461e-04   1.281 0.200729     
as.factor(company)173  -3.895e-04  5.991e-04  -0.650 0.515879     
as.factor(company)174  -3.317e-04  8.418e-04  -0.394 0.693701     
as.factor(company)175  -8.437e-04  7.351e-04  -1.148 0.251592     
as.factor(company)176  -2.011e-06  5.911e-04  -0.003 0.997287     
as.factor(company)178  -1.708e-04  6.010e-04  -0.284 0.776368     
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as.factor(company)179   2.072e-04  6.588e-04   0.314 0.753303     
as.factor(company)180   1.708e-04  6.232e-04   0.274 0.784200     
as.factor(company)181  -3.230e-04  5.904e-04  -0.547 0.584482     
as.factor(company)182  -7.514e-04  6.967e-04  -1.078 0.281326     
as.factor(company)183  -2.072e-04  6.254e-04  -0.331 0.740526     
as.factor(company)184   2.891e-04  6.307e-04   0.458 0.646834     
as.factor(company)185   8.522e-04  6.131e-04   1.390 0.165149     
as.factor(company)186   5.084e-04  5.983e-04   0.850 0.395860     
as.factor(company)187  -2.312e-04  6.991e-04  -0.331 0.741043     
as.factor(company)188   4.003e-04  6.093e-04   0.657 0.511488     
as.factor(company)189  -1.035e-04  5.946e-04  -0.174 0.861876     
as.factor(company)190   3.679e-04  7.011e-04   0.525 0.599955     
as.factor(company)191  -1.373e-04  6.606e-04  -0.208 0.835495     
as.factor(company)192  -1.007e-03  4.908e-04  -2.051 0.040809 *   
as.factor(company)193  -9.835e-05  8.430e-04  -0.117 0.907171     
as.factor(company)194  -4.426e-04  5.960e-04  -0.743 0.458065     
as.factor(company)195  -8.037e-04  4.908e-04  -1.638 0.102128     
as.factor(company)196  -4.534e-04  6.112e-04  -0.742 0.458515     
as.factor(company)197  -4.838e-05  8.615e-04  -0.056 0.955239     
as.factor(company)199   1.341e-03  6.109e-04   2.196 0.028533 *   
as.numeric(nib)        -5.514e-05  5.405e-05  -1.020 0.308141     
as.numeric(nbmeeting)  -7.041e-07  1.609e-05  -0.044 0.965122     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.0006681 on 520 degrees of freedom 
  (29 observations deleted due to missingness) 
Multiple R-squared:  0.9883, Adjusted R-squared:  0.9839  
F-statistic:   225 on 195 and 520 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
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Appendix 8: Tobin’s Q output with time effect 
 
The following output shows the results for Tobin`s Q with taking time into 
consideration 
Call: 
lm(formula = TobinQ ~ +as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) +  
    as.factor(industry) + as.numeric(leverage) + as.numeric(nbcom) +  
    as.numeric(employees) + as.factor(company) + as.factor(Year) +  
    as.numeric(nib) + as.numeric(nbmeeting), data = mydata) 
 
Residuals: 
       Min         1Q     Median         3Q        Max  
-0.0070201 -0.0001222  0.0000000  0.0001178  0.0091037  
 
Coefficients: 
                         Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)             1.028e-03  1.371e-03   0.750 0.453637     
as.numeric(Audit)      -8.391e-05  1.020e-03  -0.082 0.934488     
as.numeric(board_size)  3.087e-05  4.701e-05   0.657 0.511650     
as.factor(industry)1    4.344e-05  4.053e-04   0.107 0.914679     
as.numeric(leverage)   -2.320e-07  2.009e-07  -1.155 0.248814     
as.numeric(nbcom)      -5.579e-05  8.903e-05  -0.627 0.531210     
as.numeric(employees)   8.656e-08  2.484e-07   0.349 0.727593     
as.factor(company)2     5.422e-05  7.345e-04   0.074 0.941181     
as.factor(company)3     3.871e-04  4.309e-04   0.898 0.369494     
as.factor(company)4     9.922e-04  6.110e-04   1.624 0.105032     
as.factor(company)5    -1.681e-04  4.542e-04  -0.370 0.711505     
as.factor(company)6    -8.303e-05  6.326e-04  -0.131 0.895620     
as.factor(company)7    -6.572e-04  5.632e-04  -1.167 0.243799     
as.factor(company)8    -3.224e-04  6.014e-04  -0.536 0.592157     
as.factor(company)9     3.951e-05  5.913e-04   0.067 0.946756     
as.factor(company)10    6.497e-03  6.474e-04  10.036  < 2e-16 *** 
as.factor(company)11    2.250e-03  5.761e-04   3.906 0.000106 *** 
as.factor(company)12    3.070e-04  6.002e-04   0.511 0.609287     
as.factor(company)13    1.038e-03  6.018e-04   1.725 0.085122 .   
as.factor(company)14    4.031e-04  5.964e-04   0.676 0.499459     
as.factor(company)15    9.006e-03  7.084e-04  12.713  < 2e-16 *** 
as.factor(company)16   -7.497e-04  4.363e-04  -1.718 0.086343 .   
as.factor(company)17    9.058e-04  8.460e-04   1.071 0.284784     
as.factor(company)18    1.327e-04  6.178e-04   0.215 0.830019     
as.factor(company)19   -1.448e-04  5.939e-04  -0.244 0.807520     
as.factor(company)20   -7.351e-04  4.499e-04  -1.634 0.102888     
as.factor(company)21   -1.985e-04  5.904e-04  -0.336 0.736919     
as.factor(company)22    2.994e-04  8.465e-04   0.354 0.723710     
as.factor(company)23    1.676e-04  6.466e-04   0.259 0.795561     
as.factor(company)24    1.310e-04  6.155e-04   0.213 0.831489     
as.factor(company)25   -4.895e-04  8.679e-04  -0.564 0.572998     
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as.factor(company)26   -2.694e-04  6.160e-04  -0.437 0.662034     
as.factor(company)27    1.141e-03  6.083e-04   1.875 0.061294 .   
as.factor(company)28   -2.402e-04  6.404e-04  -0.375 0.707796     
as.factor(company)29    1.081e-03  6.006e-04   1.799 0.072539 .   
as.factor(company)30   -3.473e-04  6.089e-04  -0.570 0.568701     
as.factor(company)32    3.225e-04  6.043e-04   0.534 0.593798     
as.factor(company)33    1.327e-03  7.014e-04   1.893 0.058979 .   
as.factor(company)34    5.088e-04  6.005e-04   0.847 0.397279     
as.factor(company)35    2.657e-03  6.028e-04   4.408 1.27e-05 *** 
as.factor(company)36   -5.447e-04  8.490e-04  -0.642 0.521409     
as.factor(company)37    1.512e-05  6.112e-04   0.025 0.980269     
as.factor(company)38   -1.247e-04  5.915e-04  -0.211 0.833131     
as.factor(company)39   -5.642e-04  6.019e-04  -0.937 0.348969     
as.factor(company)40   -6.951e-04  7.290e-04  -0.954 0.340731     
as.factor(company)41   -2.514e-04  5.899e-04  -0.426 0.670120     
as.factor(company)42   -9.141e-04  7.308e-04  -1.251 0.211543     
as.factor(company)43    8.222e-05  6.503e-04   0.126 0.899445     
as.factor(company)44    1.228e-04  6.352e-04   0.193 0.846835     
as.factor(company)45    9.933e-04  5.905e-04   1.682 0.093160 .   
as.factor(company)46    7.134e-04  8.429e-04   0.846 0.397734     
as.factor(company)47   -1.916e-04  6.071e-04  -0.316 0.752480     
as.factor(company)48    2.182e-03  6.007e-04   3.633 0.000308 *** 
as.factor(company)49   -2.582e-04  6.037e-04  -0.428 0.668990     
as.factor(company)50   -2.935e-04  6.294e-04  -0.466 0.641116     
as.factor(company)51    1.075e-03  6.057e-04   1.775 0.076474 .   
as.factor(company)52   -3.854e-04  4.594e-04  -0.839 0.401867     
as.factor(company)53   -3.560e-04  5.420e-04  -0.657 0.511553     
as.factor(company)54   -1.968e-05  6.999e-04  -0.028 0.977580     
as.factor(company)55    3.998e-03  8.451e-04   4.731 2.89e-06 *** 
as.factor(company)56    3.299e-04  6.137e-04   0.538 0.591099     
as.factor(company)57    8.410e-04  8.469e-04   0.993 0.321172     
as.factor(company)59   -4.784e-04  6.965e-04  -0.687 0.492498     
as.factor(company)60    1.365e-03  6.099e-04   2.238 0.025648 *   
as.factor(company)61   -7.305e-04  5.986e-04  -1.220 0.222848     
as.factor(company)62   -2.083e-05  5.902e-04  -0.035 0.971859     
as.factor(company)63   -2.156e-04  6.048e-04  -0.356 0.721669     
as.factor(company)64    8.639e-04  6.185e-04   1.397 0.163048     
as.factor(company)65   -4.152e-04  6.337e-04  -0.655 0.512605     
as.factor(company)66   -2.423e-04  6.228e-04  -0.389 0.697446     
as.factor(company)67   -3.733e-04  8.429e-04  -0.443 0.658015     
as.factor(company)68    1.761e-03  6.027e-04   2.922 0.003626 **  
as.factor(company)69   -4.301e-04  6.059e-04  -0.710 0.478140     
as.factor(company)70    7.773e-03  4.363e-04  17.817  < 2e-16 *** 
as.factor(company)71    1.157e-03  7.423e-04   1.558 0.119800     
as.factor(company)73    1.039e-04  7.523e-04   0.138 0.890226     
as.factor(company)74    1.066e-03  5.922e-04   1.801 0.072301 .   
as.factor(company)75   -2.907e-04  4.635e-04  -0.627 0.530884     
as.factor(company)76    2.997e-03  6.227e-04   4.813 1.96e-06 *** 
as.factor(company)77   -5.398e-04  5.328e-04  -1.013 0.311415     
as.factor(company)78   -7.140e-04  4.522e-04  -1.579 0.114944     
65 
 
as.factor(company)79    2.472e-03  4.598e-04   5.377 1.15e-07 *** 
as.factor(company)80    1.425e-03  6.045e-04   2.358 0.018737 *   
as.factor(company)81    7.662e-05  6.010e-04   0.128 0.898591     
as.factor(company)82    1.951e-05  5.898e-04   0.033 0.973625     
as.factor(company)83    2.388e-04  6.060e-04   0.394 0.693651     
as.factor(company)84    3.550e-04  6.076e-04   0.584 0.559318     
as.factor(company)85    2.445e-03  5.983e-04   4.086 5.09e-05 *** 
as.factor(company)86   -6.238e-04  7.104e-04  -0.878 0.380250     
as.factor(company)87    1.667e-03  6.002e-04   2.778 0.005675 **  
as.factor(company)88   -3.850e-04  5.998e-04  -0.642 0.521207     
as.factor(company)89    6.390e-04  8.385e-04   0.762 0.446399     
as.factor(company)90    1.764e-03  6.004e-04   2.939 0.003439 **  
as.factor(company)91    5.375e-05  8.467e-04   0.063 0.949412     
as.factor(company)92   -2.212e-04  5.970e-04  -0.370 0.711165     
as.factor(company)93    1.975e-03  7.023e-04   2.813 0.005102 **  
as.factor(company)94    5.733e-04  6.036e-04   0.950 0.342650     
as.factor(company)95    1.905e-03  6.531e-04   2.917 0.003694 **  
as.factor(company)96   -1.389e-04  6.054e-04  -0.229 0.818599     
as.factor(company)97    8.936e-04  8.496e-04   1.052 0.293335     
as.factor(company)98   -2.703e-04  6.010e-04  -0.450 0.653050     
as.factor(company)99   -8.433e-04  4.367e-04  -1.931 0.054031 .   
as.factor(company)100  -8.036e-04  4.403e-04  -1.825 0.068573 .   
as.factor(company)101  -8.300e-04  4.399e-04  -1.887 0.059746 .   
as.factor(company)102   4.591e-04  5.177e-04   0.887 0.375542     
as.factor(company)103  -7.535e-05  6.202e-04  -0.121 0.903345     
as.factor(company)104  -4.968e-04  6.913e-04  -0.719 0.472704     
as.factor(company)105  -1.291e-05  5.967e-04  -0.022 0.982750     
as.factor(company)106   1.628e-05  6.490e-04   0.025 0.980001     
as.factor(company)107   5.511e-04  6.101e-04   0.903 0.366779     
as.factor(company)108  -5.932e-04  7.297e-04  -0.813 0.416600     
as.factor(company)109   1.739e-04  6.468e-04   0.269 0.788075     
as.factor(company)110  -3.544e-04  8.463e-04  -0.419 0.675543     
as.factor(company)111  -9.484e-06  5.889e-04  -0.016 0.987156     
as.factor(company)112  -3.539e-04  6.931e-04  -0.511 0.609897     
as.factor(company)113  -3.041e-04  5.988e-04  -0.508 0.611838     
as.factor(company)114   3.020e-03  6.025e-04   5.013 7.36e-07 *** 
as.factor(company)115  -5.187e-04  8.448e-04  -0.614 0.539517     
as.factor(company)116   5.422e-03  8.639e-04   6.277 7.33e-10 *** 
as.factor(company)117  -8.438e-04  4.388e-04  -1.923 0.055060 .   
as.factor(company)118   8.452e-04  8.355e-04   1.012 0.312170     
as.factor(company)119   5.197e-04  7.034e-04   0.739 0.460322     
as.factor(company)120   1.954e-07  5.915e-04   0.000 0.999736     
as.factor(company)121  -3.889e-04  5.871e-04  -0.663 0.507940     
as.factor(company)122   3.154e-04  5.896e-04   0.535 0.592859     
as.factor(company)123  -1.957e-04  5.916e-04  -0.331 0.740942     
as.factor(company)124  -6.256e-04  7.371e-04  -0.849 0.396453     
as.factor(company)125   8.786e-05  1.332e-03   0.066 0.947441     
as.factor(company)126  -9.426e-04  6.126e-04  -1.539 0.124504     
as.factor(company)127  -2.230e-04  8.571e-04  -0.260 0.794834     
as.factor(company)128   4.416e-04  4.226e-04   1.045 0.296507     
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as.factor(company)129  -6.614e-04  4.917e-04  -1.345 0.179140     
as.factor(company)130   9.804e-04  1.317e-03   0.744 0.457101     
as.factor(company)131   1.434e-03  6.099e-04   2.352 0.019070 *   
as.factor(company)132   2.481e-04  5.893e-04   0.421 0.673939     
as.factor(company)134   3.156e-04  6.172e-04   0.511 0.609315     
as.factor(company)135  -9.533e-04  5.830e-04  -1.635 0.102630     
as.factor(company)136  -1.630e-04  6.454e-04  -0.253 0.800670     
as.factor(company)137   6.113e-02  6.003e-04 101.831  < 2e-16 *** 
as.factor(company)138  -8.176e-05  6.070e-04  -0.135 0.892905     
as.factor(company)139  -2.215e-06  4.349e-04  -0.005 0.995939     
as.factor(company)140  -8.309e-05  6.113e-04  -0.136 0.891933     
as.factor(company)141   3.574e-03  7.027e-04   5.086 5.12e-07 *** 
as.factor(company)142  -7.853e-04  4.429e-04  -1.773 0.076825 .   
as.factor(company)143  -6.148e-04  6.030e-04  -1.020 0.308378     
as.factor(company)144  -2.188e-04  6.043e-04  -0.362 0.717496     
as.factor(company)145   3.360e-05  8.481e-04   0.040 0.968415     
as.factor(company)146  -5.722e-04  4.251e-04  -1.346 0.178906     
as.factor(company)147   1.924e-03  6.765e-04   2.844 0.004627 **  
as.factor(company)153  -2.756e-04  5.917e-04  -0.466 0.641521     
as.factor(company)154  -1.116e-04  7.074e-04  -0.158 0.874741     
as.factor(company)155   1.090e-03  5.911e-04   1.843 0.065844 .   
as.factor(company)156   1.691e-03  6.506e-04   2.599 0.009606 **  
as.factor(company)157   1.070e-03  5.913e-04   1.809 0.070955 .   
as.factor(company)158   6.191e-05  6.006e-04   0.103 0.917931     
as.factor(company)159   4.030e-04  6.054e-04   0.666 0.505872     
as.factor(company)160  -2.955e-04  7.166e-04  -0.412 0.680230     
as.factor(company)161   9.004e-04  6.204e-04   1.451 0.147299     
as.factor(company)162   2.024e-03  5.911e-04   3.424 0.000666 *** 
as.factor(company)163   1.308e-03  1.337e-03   0.978 0.328343     
as.factor(company)164  -1.505e-04  5.861e-04  -0.257 0.797426     
as.factor(company)165  -8.750e-04  4.287e-04  -2.041 0.041748 *   
as.factor(company)166   1.764e-04  6.905e-04   0.255 0.798516     
as.factor(company)167  -1.778e-05  4.427e-04  -0.040 0.967971     
as.factor(company)168  -6.565e-04  5.186e-04  -1.266 0.206120     
as.factor(company)169   1.154e-03  6.231e-04   1.852 0.064533 .   
as.factor(company)170   4.564e-04  5.939e-04   0.768 0.442570     
as.factor(company)171   9.702e-05  5.985e-04   0.162 0.871284     
as.factor(company)172   1.203e-03  8.382e-04   1.436 0.151660     
as.factor(company)173  -3.532e-04  5.922e-04  -0.596 0.551111     
as.factor(company)174  -5.145e-04  8.337e-04  -0.617 0.537411     
as.factor(company)175  -7.311e-04  7.275e-04  -1.005 0.315435     
as.factor(company)176  -2.437e-05  5.840e-04  -0.042 0.966729     
as.factor(company)178  -1.572e-04  5.940e-04  -0.265 0.791396     
as.factor(company)179   3.132e-04  6.510e-04   0.481 0.630593     
as.factor(company)180   2.311e-04  6.170e-04   0.375 0.708141     
as.factor(company)181  -3.066e-04  5.834e-04  -0.526 0.599421     
as.factor(company)182  -7.833e-04  6.900e-04  -1.135 0.256832     
as.factor(company)183  -1.248e-04  6.183e-04  -0.202 0.840079     
as.factor(company)184   2.834e-04  6.231e-04   0.455 0.649429     
as.factor(company)185   8.792e-04  6.063e-04   1.450 0.147656     
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as.factor(company)186   4.601e-04  5.912e-04   0.778 0.436819     
as.factor(company)187  -2.628e-04  6.903e-04  -0.381 0.703618     
as.factor(company)188   4.750e-04  6.022e-04   0.789 0.430553     
as.factor(company)189  -6.961e-05  5.875e-04  -0.118 0.905723     
as.factor(company)190   4.324e-04  6.945e-04   0.623 0.533793     
as.factor(company)191  -3.344e-05  6.540e-04  -0.051 0.959239     
as.factor(company)192  -8.767e-04  4.863e-04  -1.803 0.072006 .   
as.factor(company)193   4.287e-05  8.342e-04   0.051 0.959038     
as.factor(company)194  -4.267e-04  5.890e-04  -0.724 0.469107     
as.factor(company)195  -7.228e-04  4.861e-04  -1.487 0.137640     
as.factor(company)196  -4.088e-04  6.042e-04  -0.677 0.498962     
as.factor(company)197   7.504e-05  8.520e-04   0.088 0.929853     
as.factor(company)199   1.352e-03  6.035e-04   2.241 0.025436 *   
as.factor(Year)2014     2.631e-04  8.500e-05   3.095 0.002072 **  
as.factor(Year)2015     1.476e-04  8.749e-05   1.687 0.092258 .   
as.factor(Year)2016    -8.358e-06  8.976e-05  -0.093 0.925847     
as.factor(Year)2017    -2.215e-05  8.717e-05  -0.254 0.799559     
as.numeric(nib)        -5.205e-05  5.553e-05  -0.937 0.349034     
as.numeric(nbmeeting)   1.378e-05  1.708e-05   0.807 0.419889     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.0006594 on 516 degrees of freedom 
  (29 observations deleted due to missingness) 
Multiple R-squared:  0.9887, Adjusted R-squared:  0.9843  
F-statistic: 226.4 on 199 and 516 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
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Appendix 9: Tobin’s Q OLS output 
 
The following output ignored both time and companies’ effect with Tobin`s Q. 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = TobinQ ~ +as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) +  
    as.factor(industry) + as.numeric(leverage) + as.numeric(nbcom) +  
    as.numeric(employees) + as.numeric(nib) + as.numeric(nbmeeting),  
    data = mydata) 
 
Residuals: 
      Min        1Q    Median        3Q       Max  
-0.003914 -0.001401 -0.000463  0.000433  0.067314  
 
Coefficients: 
                         Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)             6.293e-03  1.840e-03   3.420 0.000662 *** 
as.numeric(Audit)       9.594e-04  1.512e-03   0.634 0.526002     
as.numeric(board_size) -1.797e-04  1.608e-04  -1.118 0.263959     
as.factor(industry)1   -4.429e-04  5.316e-04  -0.833 0.405046     
as.numeric(leverage)   -4.881e-06  9.563e-07  -5.104 4.27e-07 *** 
as.numeric(nbcom)      -8.239e-04  2.621e-04  -3.144 0.001737 **  
as.numeric(employees)   1.365e-06  9.247e-07   1.476 0.140423     
as.numeric(nib)         5.035e-05  1.845e-04   0.273 0.785069     
as.numeric(nbmeeting)   3.065e-05  7.801e-05   0.393 0.694512     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.005117 on 707 degrees of freedom 
  (29 observations deleted due to missingness) 
Multiple R-squared:  0.06586, Adjusted R-squared:  0.05529  
F-statistic: 6.231 on 8 and 707 DF,  p-value: 8.4e-08 
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Appendix 10: Tobin’s Q fixed model 
 
This is the fixed model that takes companies’ effect as factors. 
 
fixed <-
plm(TobinQ~as.numeric(Audit)+(as.numeric(board_size))+as.factor(industry)+as.nu
meric(leverage)+as.numeric(nbcom)+as.numeric(employees)+as.numeric(nib)+as.nu
meric(nbmeeting), index=c("company"),data=mydata,model="between") 
summary(fixed) 
 
Oneway (individual) effect Between Model 
 
Call: 
plm(formula = TobinQ ~ as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) +  
    as.factor(industry) + as.numeric(leverage) + as.numeric(nbcom) +  
    as.numeric(employees) + as.numeric(nib) + as.numeric(nbmeeting),  
    data = mydata, model = "between", index = c("company")) 
 
Unbalanced Panel: n = 188, T = 1-5, N = 716 
Observations used in estimation: 188 
 
Residuals: 
       Min.     1st Qu.      Median     3rd Qu.        Max.  
-0.00321954 -0.00134079 -0.00034736  0.00050149  0.05775967  
 
Coefficients: 
                          Estimate  Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)             6.1709e-03  3.3011e-03  1.8693 0.063212 .  
as.numeric(Audit)       4.9796e-04  2.5953e-03  0.1919 0.848060    
as.numeric(board_size) -1.5570e-04  3.0414e-04 -0.5119 0.609330    
as.factor(industry)1   -6.7251e-04  9.0663e-04 -0.7418 0.459200    
as.numeric(leverage)   -5.8296e-06  1.9640e-06 -2.9682 0.003405 ** 
as.numeric(nbcom)      -9.2654e-04  5.1444e-04 -1.8011 0.073377 .  
as.numeric(employees)   2.0074e-06  1.7668e-06  1.1362 0.257400    
as.numeric(nib)         8.3892e-05  3.6113e-04  0.2323 0.816566    
as.numeric(nbmeeting)   9.0999e-05  1.7099e-04  0.5322 0.595259    
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Total Sum of Squares:    0.0040475 
Residual Sum of Squares: 0.0037148 
R-Squared:      0.082192 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.041173 
F-statistic: 2.00374 on 8 and 179 DF, p-value: 0.04837 
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Appendix 11: Tobin’s Q f-test 
 
This is F test to show which model is better (fixed model or ordinary least square 
method). 
F test for individual effects 
 
data:  TobinQ ~ as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) + as.factor(industry) +  
... 
F = 1.3501, df1 = 528, df2 = 179, p-value = 0.008902 
alternative hypothesis: significant effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
